sync with OpenBSD -current
This commit is contained in:
parent
46994dfb53
commit
caf62be22c
18 changed files with 499 additions and 445 deletions
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: err_prn.c,v 1.20 2023/07/07 13:54:45 beck Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: err_prn.c,v 1.22 2024/01/10 14:23:37 tb Exp $ */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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@ -93,12 +94,9 @@ LCRYPTO_ALIAS(ERR_print_errors_cb);
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static int
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print_fp(const char *str, size_t len, void *fp)
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{
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BIO bio;
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BIO_set(&bio, BIO_s_file());
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BIO_set_fp(&bio, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
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return BIO_printf(&bio, "%s", str);
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if (len > INT_MAX)
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return -1;
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return fprintf(fp, "%.*s", (int)len, str);
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}
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void
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@ -111,7 +109,7 @@ LCRYPTO_ALIAS(ERR_print_errors_fp);
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static int
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print_bio(const char *str, size_t len, void *bp)
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{
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return BIO_write((BIO *)bp, str, len);
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return BIO_write(bp, str, len);
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}
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void
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: rsa_ameth.c,v 1.56 2024/01/04 17:01:26 tb Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: rsa_ameth.c,v 1.57 2024/01/10 14:59:19 tb Exp $ */
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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 2006.
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*/
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@ -74,10 +74,6 @@
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#include "rsa_local.h"
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#include "x509_local.h"
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/* Macros to test if a pkey or ctx is for a PSS key */
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#define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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#define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
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static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
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static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
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@ -453,7 +449,8 @@ pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv)
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
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goto err;
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s ", pkey_is_pss(pkey) ? "RSA-PSS" : "RSA") <= 0)
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s ",
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pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS ? "RSA-PSS" : "RSA") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (priv && x->d != NULL) {
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@ -485,7 +482,8 @@ pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv)
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if (!bn_printf(bp, x->iqmp, off, "coefficient:"))
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goto err;
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}
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if (pkey_is_pss(pkey) && !rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 1, x->pss, off))
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if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS &&
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!rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 1, x->pss, off))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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@ -539,7 +537,7 @@ rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
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break;
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case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
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if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
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if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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return -2;
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if (arg1 == 0)
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PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
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break;
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case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
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if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
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if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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return -2;
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if (arg1 == 0)
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return rsa_cms_encrypt(arg2);
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break;
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case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
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if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
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if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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return -2;
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*(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
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return 1;
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if (nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkey_ctx, alg, NULL);
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/* Only PSS allowed for PSS keys */
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if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(pkey_ctx)) {
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if (pkey_ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
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RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* $OpenBSD: x509_trs.c,v 1.35 2024/01/08 03:32:01 tb Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: x509_trs.c,v 1.39 2024/01/10 21:34:53 tb Exp $ */
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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 1999.
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*/
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "x509_local.h"
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static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int
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obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
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int i, nid;
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X509_CERT_AUX *ax;
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static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int (*default_trust)(int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
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ax = x->aux;
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if (!ax)
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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if (ax->reject) {
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
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obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
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nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
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if (nid == id || nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage)
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return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
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}
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}
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if (ax->trust) {
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
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obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
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nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
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if (nid == id || nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage)
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return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
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}
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}
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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}
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static int
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trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
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return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
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else
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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}
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static int
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trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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if (x->aux && (x->aux->trust || x->aux->reject))
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return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
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/* we don't have any trust settings: for compatibility
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* we return trusted if it is self signed
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*/
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return trust_compat(trust, x, flags);
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}
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static int
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trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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if (x->aux)
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return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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}
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/* WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust
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* and without any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust
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#define X509_TRUST_COUNT (sizeof(trstandard) / sizeof(trstandard[0]))
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static int (*default_trust)(int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
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int
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(*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust)(int , X509 *, int)))(int, X509 *, int)
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{
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return xp->trust;
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}
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LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_TRUST_get_trust);
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static int
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trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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if (x->aux && (x->aux->trust || x->aux->reject))
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return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
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/* we don't have any trust settings: for compatibility
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* we return trusted if it is self signed
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*/
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return trust_compat(trust, x, flags);
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}
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static int
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trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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if (x->aux)
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return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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}
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static int
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trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
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return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
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else
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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}
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static int
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obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
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int i, nid;
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X509_CERT_AUX *ax;
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ax = x->aux;
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if (!ax)
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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if (ax->reject) {
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
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obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
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nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
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if (nid == id || nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage)
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return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
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}
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}
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if (ax->trust) {
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
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obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
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nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
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if (nid == id || nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage)
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return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
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}
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}
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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}
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/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.138 2024/01/09 07:25:57 tb Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.139 2024/01/10 17:31:28 tb Exp $ */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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}
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LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit);
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static int
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x509_vfy_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose, int trust)
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int
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose_id)
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{
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/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
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if (purpose != 0) {
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const X509_PURPOSE *purp;
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int purpose_idx;
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const X509_PURPOSE *purpose;
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int idx;
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if (purpose < X509_PURPOSE_MIN || purpose > X509_PURPOSE_MAX) {
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X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
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return 0;
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}
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purpose_idx = purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
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if ((purp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(purpose_idx)) == NULL) {
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X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
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return 0;
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}
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/* XXX - Match wacky/documented behavior. Do we need to keep this? */
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if (purpose_id == 0)
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return 1;
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/* If trust is unset, use the purpose's trust. */
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if (trust == 0)
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trust = purp->trust;
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if (purpose_id < X509_PURPOSE_MIN || purpose_id > X509_PURPOSE_MAX) {
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X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
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return 0;
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}
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if (trust != 0) {
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if (trust < X509_TRUST_MIN || trust > X509_TRUST_MAX) {
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X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
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return 0;
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}
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idx = purpose_id - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
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if ((purpose = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx)) == NULL) {
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X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
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return 0;
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}
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if (purpose != 0 && ctx->param->purpose == 0)
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ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
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if (trust != 0 && ctx->param->trust == 0)
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ctx->param->trust = trust;
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/* XXX - Succeeding while ignoring purpose_id and trust is awful. */
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if (ctx->param->purpose == 0)
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ctx->param->purpose = purpose_id;
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if (ctx->param->trust == 0)
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ctx->param->trust = purpose->trust;
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return 1;
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}
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int
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
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{
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return x509_vfy_purpose_inherit(ctx, purpose, 0);
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}
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LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose);
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int
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust_id)
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{
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return x509_vfy_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, trust);
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/* XXX - Match wacky/documented behavior. Do we need to keep this? */
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if (trust_id == 0)
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return 1;
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if (trust_id < X509_TRUST_MIN || trust_id > X509_TRUST_MAX) {
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X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
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return 0;
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}
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/* XXX - Succeeding while ignoring the trust_id is awful. */
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if (ctx->param->trust == 0)
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ctx->param->trust = trust_id;
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return 1;
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}
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LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust);
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