sync
This commit is contained in:
parent
f609457dcf
commit
62073e0295
GPG key ID:
F42C07F07E2E35B7
318 changed files with 8112 additions and 4346 deletions
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.125 2023/04/28 16:30:14 tb Exp $
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# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.129 2023/05/07 14:39:55 tb Exp $
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LIB= crypto
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LIBREBUILD=y
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ LCRYPTO_SRC= ${.CURDIR}
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CFLAGS+= -Wall -Wundef
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.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} == "clang"
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CFLAGS+= -Werror
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CFLAGS+= -Werror -Wshadow
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.endif
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CFLAGS+= -DLIBRESSL_INTERNAL -DLIBRESSL_CRYPTO_INTERNAL
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.ifdef NAMESPACE
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@ -606,6 +606,7 @@ SRCS+= rsa_prn.c
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SRCS+= rsa_pss.c
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SRCS+= rsa_saos.c
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SRCS+= rsa_sign.c
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SRCS+= rsa_x931.c
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# sha/
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SRCS+= sha1.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: bn_bpsw.c,v 1.8 2022/11/26 16:08:51 tb Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: bn_bpsw.c,v 1.10 2023/05/10 21:05:24 tb Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2022 Martin Grenouilloux <martin.grenouilloux@lse.epita.fr>
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* Copyright (c) 2022 Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
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@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ bn_lucas(BIGNUM *U, BIGNUM *V, const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *D,
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*/
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static int
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bn_strong_lucas_test(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *D,
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bn_strong_lucas_test(int *is_pseudoprime, const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *D,
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BN_CTX *ctx)
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{
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BIGNUM *k, *U, *V;
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@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ bn_strong_lucas_test(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *D,
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goto err;
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if (BN_is_zero(U) || BN_is_zero(V)) {
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*is_prime = 1;
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*is_pseudoprime = 1;
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goto done;
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}
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@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ bn_strong_lucas_test(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *D,
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goto err;
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if (BN_is_zero(V)) {
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*is_prime = 1;
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*is_pseudoprime = 1;
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goto done;
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}
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}
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@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ bn_strong_lucas_test(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *D,
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* If we got here, n is definitely composite.
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*/
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*is_prime = 0;
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*is_pseudoprime = 0;
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done:
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ret = 1;
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@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ bn_strong_lucas_test(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *D,
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*/
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static int
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bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(int *is_pseudoprime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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{
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BIGNUM *D, *two;
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int is_perfect_square, jacobi_symbol, sign;
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@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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if (!bn_is_perfect_square(&is_perfect_square, n, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (is_perfect_square) {
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*is_prime = 0;
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*is_pseudoprime = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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/* n and D have prime factors in common. */
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if (jacobi_symbol == 0) {
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*is_prime = 0;
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*is_pseudoprime = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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BN_set_negative(D, sign == -1);
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}
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if (!bn_strong_lucas_test(is_prime, n, D, ctx))
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if (!bn_strong_lucas_test(is_pseudoprime, n, D, ctx))
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goto err;
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done:
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@ -301,32 +301,113 @@ bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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}
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/*
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* Miller-Rabin primality test for base 2.
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* Fermat criterion in Miller-Rabin test.
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*
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* Check whether 1 < base < n - 1 witnesses that n is composite. For prime n:
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*
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* * Fermat's little theorem: base^(n-1) = 1 (mod n).
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* * The only square roots of 1 (mod n) are 1 and -1.
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*
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* Calculate base^((n-1)/2) by writing n - 1 = k * 2^s with odd k. Iteratively
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* compute power = (base^k)^(2^(s-1)) by successive squaring of base^k.
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*
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* If power ever reaches -1, base^(n-1) is equal to 1 and n is a pseudoprime
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* for base. If power reaches 1 before -1 during successive squaring, we have
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* an unexpected square root of 1 and n is composite. Otherwise base^(n-1) != 1,
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* and n is composite.
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*/
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static int
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bn_miller_rabin_base_2(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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bn_fermat(int *is_pseudoprime, const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *n_minus_one,
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const BIGNUM *k, int s, const BIGNUM *base, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mctx)
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{
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BIGNUM *n_minus_one, *k, *x;
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int i, s;
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BIGNUM *power;
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int ret = 0;
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int i;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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if ((power = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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/* Sanity check: ensure that 1 < base < n - 1. */
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if (BN_cmp(base, BN_value_one()) <= 0 || BN_cmp(base, n_minus_one) >= 0)
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goto err;
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if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_ct(power, base, k, n, ctx, mctx))
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goto err;
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if (BN_is_one(power) || BN_cmp(power, n_minus_one) == 0) {
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*is_pseudoprime = 1;
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goto done;
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}
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/* Loop invariant: power is neither 1 nor -1 (mod n). */
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for (i = 1; i < s; i++) {
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if (!BN_mod_sqr(power, power, n, ctx))
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goto err;
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/* n is a pseudoprime for base. */
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if (BN_cmp(power, n_minus_one) == 0) {
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*is_pseudoprime = 1;
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goto done;
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}
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/* n is composite: there's a square root of unity != 1 or -1. */
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if (BN_is_one(power)) {
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*is_pseudoprime = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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}
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/*
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* If we get here, n is definitely composite: base^(n-1) != 1.
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*/
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*is_pseudoprime = 0;
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done:
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Miller-Rabin primality test for base 2 and for |rounds| of random bases.
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* On success: is_pseudoprime == 0 implies that n is composite.
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*/
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static int
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bn_miller_rabin(int *is_pseudoprime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx,
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size_t rounds)
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{
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BN_MONT_CTX *mctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *base, *k, *n_minus_one, *three;
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size_t i;
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int s;
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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if ((n_minus_one = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
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if ((base = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((k = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
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if ((n_minus_one = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((three = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (BN_is_word(n, 2) || BN_is_word(n, 3)) {
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*is_prime = 1;
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*is_pseudoprime = 1;
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goto done;
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}
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if (BN_cmp(n, BN_value_one()) <= 0 || !BN_is_odd(n)) {
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*is_prime = 0;
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*is_pseudoprime = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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@ -344,43 +425,57 @@ bn_miller_rabin_base_2(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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goto err;
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/*
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* If 2^k is 1 or -1 (mod n) then n is a 2-pseudoprime.
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* Montgomery setup for n.
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*/
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if (!BN_set_word(x, 2))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_mod_exp_ct(x, x, k, n, ctx))
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if ((mctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (BN_is_one(x) || BN_cmp(x, n_minus_one) == 0) {
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*is_prime = 1;
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mctx, n, ctx))
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goto err;
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/*
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* Perform a Miller-Rabin test for base 2 as required by BPSW.
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*/
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if (!BN_set_word(base, 2))
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goto err;
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if (!bn_fermat(is_pseudoprime, n, n_minus_one, k, s, base, ctx, mctx))
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goto err;
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if (!*is_pseudoprime)
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goto done;
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}
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/*
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* If 2^{2^i k} == -1 (mod n) for some 1 <= i < s, then n is a
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* 2-pseudoprime.
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* Perform Miller-Rabin tests with random 3 <= base < n - 1 to reduce
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* risk of false positives in BPSW.
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*/
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for (i = 1; i < s; i++) {
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if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, x, n, ctx))
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if (!BN_set_word(three, 3))
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goto err;
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for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
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if (!bn_rand_interval(base, three, n_minus_one))
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goto err;
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if (BN_cmp(x, n_minus_one) == 0) {
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*is_prime = 1;
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if (!bn_fermat(is_pseudoprime, n, n_minus_one, k, s, base, ctx,
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mctx))
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goto err;
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if (!*is_pseudoprime)
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goto done;
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}
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}
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|
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/*
|
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* If we got here, n is definitely composite.
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* If we got here, we have a Miller-Rabin pseudoprime.
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*/
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*is_prime = 0;
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*is_pseudoprime = 1;
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done:
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(mctx);
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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return ret;
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@ -392,7 +487,8 @@ bn_miller_rabin_base_2(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
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*/
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int
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bn_is_prime_bpsw(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
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bn_is_prime_bpsw(int *is_pseudoprime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *in_ctx,
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size_t rounds)
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{
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BN_ULONG mod;
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@ -400,12 +496,12 @@ bn_is_prime_bpsw(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
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int ret = 0;
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if (BN_is_word(n, 2)) {
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*is_prime = 1;
|
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*is_pseudoprime = 1;
|
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goto done;
|
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}
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|
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if (BN_cmp(n, BN_value_one()) <= 0 || !BN_is_odd(n)) {
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*is_prime = 0;
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*is_pseudoprime = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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@ -414,7 +510,7 @@ bn_is_prime_bpsw(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
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if ((mod = BN_mod_word(n, primes[i])) == (BN_ULONG)-1)
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goto err;
|
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if (mod == 0) {
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*is_prime = BN_is_word(n, primes[i]);
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*is_pseudoprime = BN_is_word(n, primes[i]);
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goto done;
|
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}
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||||
}
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@ -424,14 +520,12 @@ bn_is_prime_bpsw(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
|
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|
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if (!bn_miller_rabin_base_2(is_prime, n, ctx))
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if (!bn_miller_rabin(is_pseudoprime, n, ctx, rounds))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!*is_prime)
|
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if (!*is_pseudoprime)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
/* XXX - Miller-Rabin for random bases? See FIPS 186-4, Table C.1. */
|
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|
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if (!bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(is_prime, n, ctx))
|
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if (!bn_strong_lucas_selfridge(is_pseudoprime, n, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: bn_convert.c,v 1.6 2023/04/19 11:14:04 jsing Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: bn_convert.c,v 1.8 2023/05/09 05:15:55 jsing Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
|
|||
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "bn_local.h"
|
||||
#include "bytestring.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static const char hex_digits[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -270,85 +271,82 @@ BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
|
|||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Must 'free' the returned data */
|
||||
char *
|
||||
BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
|
||||
BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *bn)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i = 0, num, bn_data_num, ok = 0;
|
||||
char *buf = NULL;
|
||||
char *p;
|
||||
BIGNUM *t = NULL;
|
||||
BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
|
||||
int started = 0;
|
||||
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
|
||||
uint8_t *data = NULL;
|
||||
size_t data_len = 0;
|
||||
uint8_t *s = NULL;
|
||||
size_t s_len;
|
||||
BN_ULONG v, w;
|
||||
uint8_t c;
|
||||
CBB cbb;
|
||||
CBS cbs;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
|
||||
buf = malloc(BN_is_negative(a) + 2);
|
||||
if (buf == NULL) {
|
||||
BNerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
p = buf;
|
||||
if (BN_is_negative(a))
|
||||
*p++ = '-';
|
||||
*p++ = '0';
|
||||
*p++ = '\0';
|
||||
return (buf);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/* get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
|
||||
* num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
|
||||
* <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.1001 + log(2) + 1 (rounding error)
|
||||
* <= BN_num_bits(a)/10 + BN_num_bits/1000 + 1 + 1
|
||||
if ((tmp = BN_dup(bn)) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Divide the BIGNUM by a large multiple of 10, then break the remainder
|
||||
* into decimal digits. This produces a reversed string of digits,
|
||||
* potentially with leading zeroes.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
|
||||
num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
|
||||
bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1;
|
||||
bn_data = reallocarray(NULL, bn_data_num, sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
||||
buf = malloc(num + 3);
|
||||
if ((buf == NULL) || (bn_data == NULL)) {
|
||||
BNerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
while (!BN_is_zero(tmp)) {
|
||||
if ((w = BN_div_word(tmp, BN_DEC_CONV)) == -1)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < BN_DEC_NUM; i++) {
|
||||
v = w % 10;
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '0' + v))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
w /= 10;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((t = BN_dup(a)) == NULL)
|
||||
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &data, &data_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
#define BUF_REMAIN (num+3 - (size_t)(p - buf))
|
||||
p = buf;
|
||||
lp = bn_data;
|
||||
if (BN_is_negative(t))
|
||||
*p++ = '-';
|
||||
if (data_len > SIZE_MAX - 3)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, data_len + 3))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
while (!BN_is_zero(t)) {
|
||||
if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num)
|
||||
if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '-'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
*lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV);
|
||||
if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Reverse digits and trim leading zeroes. */
|
||||
CBS_init(&cbs, data, data_len);
|
||||
while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
|
||||
if (!CBS_get_last_u8(&cbs, &c))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
lp++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
lp--;
|
||||
/* We now have a series of blocks, BN_DEC_NUM chars
|
||||
* in length, where the last one needs truncation.
|
||||
* The blocks need to be reversed in order. */
|
||||
snprintf(p, BUF_REMAIN, BN_DEC_FMT1, *lp);
|
||||
while (*p)
|
||||
p++;
|
||||
while (lp != bn_data) {
|
||||
lp--;
|
||||
snprintf(p, BUF_REMAIN, BN_DEC_FMT2, *lp);
|
||||
while (*p)
|
||||
p++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ok = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
free(bn_data);
|
||||
BN_free(t);
|
||||
if (!ok && buf) {
|
||||
free(buf);
|
||||
buf = NULL;
|
||||
if (!started && c == '0')
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, c))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
started = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return (buf);
|
||||
if (!started) {
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '0'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '\0'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &s, &s_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_free(tmp);
|
||||
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
||||
freezero(data, data_len);
|
||||
|
||||
return s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
|
|
@ -420,39 +418,49 @@ err:
|
|||
return (0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Must 'free' the returned data */
|
||||
char *
|
||||
BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
|
||||
BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *bn)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i, j, v, z = 0;
|
||||
char *buf;
|
||||
char *p;
|
||||
int started = 0;
|
||||
uint8_t *s = NULL;
|
||||
size_t s_len;
|
||||
BN_ULONG v, w;
|
||||
int i, j;
|
||||
CBB cbb;
|
||||
|
||||
buf = malloc(BN_is_negative(a) + a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
|
||||
if (buf == NULL) {
|
||||
BNerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '-'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
p = buf;
|
||||
if (BN_is_negative(a))
|
||||
*p++ = '-';
|
||||
if (BN_is_zero(a))
|
||||
*p++ = '0';
|
||||
for (i = a->top - 1; i >=0; i--) {
|
||||
if (BN_is_zero(bn)) {
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '0'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (i = bn->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
||||
w = bn->d[i];
|
||||
for (j = BN_BITS2 - 8; j >= 0; j -= 8) {
|
||||
/* strip leading zeros */
|
||||
v = ((int)(a->d[i] >> (long)j)) & 0xff;
|
||||
if (z || (v != 0)) {
|
||||
*p++ = hex_digits[v >> 4];
|
||||
*p++ = hex_digits[v & 0x0f];
|
||||
z = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
v = (w >> j) & 0xff;
|
||||
if (!started && v == 0)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hex_digits[v >> 4]))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hex_digits[v & 0xf]))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
started = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
*p = '\0';
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '\0'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &s, &s_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
return (buf);
|
||||
err:
|
||||
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
||||
|
||||
return s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: bn_exp.c,v 1.45 2023/03/30 14:21:10 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: bn_exp.c,v 1.46 2023/05/09 05:38:11 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
|
|||
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
|
||||
if (bits == 0) {
|
||||
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
|
||||
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
|
||||
if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
BN_zero(r);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
|
|
@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
|
|||
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
|
||||
if (bits == 0) {
|
||||
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
|
||||
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
|
||||
if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
BN_zero(rr);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
|
|
@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ BN_mod_exp_mont_internal(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIG
|
|||
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
|
||||
if (bits == 0) {
|
||||
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
|
||||
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
|
||||
if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
BN_zero(rr);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
|
|
@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
|
|||
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
|
||||
if (bits == 0) {
|
||||
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
|
||||
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
|
||||
if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
BN_zero(rr);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
|
|
@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
|
|||
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
|
||||
if (bits == 0) {
|
||||
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
|
||||
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
|
||||
if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
BN_zero(r);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: bn_local.h,v 1.21 2023/04/25 17:59:41 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: bn_local.h,v 1.22 2023/05/10 12:21:55 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ int bn_copy(BIGNUM *dst, const BIGNUM *src);
|
|||
int bn_isqrt(BIGNUM *out_sqrt, int *out_perfect, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
|
||||
int bn_is_perfect_square(int *out_perfect, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
int bn_is_prime_bpsw(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *in_ctx);
|
||||
int bn_is_prime_bpsw(int *is_prime, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx, size_t rounds);
|
||||
|
||||
__END_HIDDEN_DECLS
|
||||
#endif /* !HEADER_BN_LOCAL_H */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: bn_prime.c,v 1.31 2023/04/25 19:57:59 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: bn_prime.c,v 1.32 2023/05/10 12:21:55 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -195,12 +195,12 @@ BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add,
|
|||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!safe) {
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, ret, ctx))
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, ret, ctx, 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!is_prime)
|
||||
goto loop;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, ret, ctx))
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, ret, ctx, 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!is_prime)
|
||||
goto loop;
|
||||
|
|
@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add,
|
|||
if (!BN_rshift1(p, ret))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, p, ctx))
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, p, ctx, 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!is_prime)
|
||||
goto loop;
|
||||
|
|
@ -243,8 +243,14 @@ BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed,
|
|||
{
|
||||
int is_prime;
|
||||
|
||||
if (checks < 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (checks == BN_prime_checks)
|
||||
checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(a));
|
||||
|
||||
/* XXX - tickle BN_GENCB in bn_is_prime_bpsw(). */
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, a, ctx_passed))
|
||||
if (!bn_is_prime_bpsw(&is_prime, a, ctx_passed, checks))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
return is_prime;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
# $OpenBSD: cert.pem,v 1.25 2022/07/11 09:05:16 sthen Exp $
|
||||
# $OpenBSD: cert.pem,v 1.26 2023/05/06 17:55:38 tb Exp $
|
||||
### /C=ES/CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=ES/CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
|
||||
|
|
@ -932,6 +932,93 @@ u79leNKGef9JOxqDDPDeeOzI8k1MGt6CKfjBWtrt7uYnXuhF0J0cUahoq0Tj0Itq
|
|||
4/g7u9xN12TyUb7mqqta6THuBrxzvxNiCp/HuZc=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Certainly
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=US/O=Certainly/CN=Certainly Root E1
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
06:25:33:b1:47:03:33:27:5c:f9:8d:9a:b9:bf:cc:f8
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Apr 1 00:00:00 2021 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Apr 1 00:00:00 2046 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=US, O=Certainly, CN=Certainly Root E1
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
F3:28:18:CB:64:75:EE:29:2A:EB:ED:AE:23:58:38:85:EB:C8:22:07
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=F9:E1:6D:DC:01:89:CF:D5:82:45:63:3E:C5:37:7D:C2:EB:93:6F:2B
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=B4:58:5F:22:E4:AC:75:6A:4E:86:12:A1:36:1C:5D:9D:03:1A:93:FD:84:FE:BB:77:8F:A3:06:8B:0F:C4:2D:C2
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIB9zCCAX2gAwIBAgIQBiUzsUcDMydc+Y2aub/M+DAKBggqhkjOPQQDAzA9MQsw
|
||||
CQYDVQQGEwJVUzESMBAGA1UEChMJQ2VydGFpbmx5MRowGAYDVQQDExFDZXJ0YWlu
|
||||
bHkgUm9vdCBFMTAeFw0yMTA0MDEwMDAwMDBaFw00NjA0MDEwMDAwMDBaMD0xCzAJ
|
||||
BgNVBAYTAlVTMRIwEAYDVQQKEwlDZXJ0YWlubHkxGjAYBgNVBAMTEUNlcnRhaW5s
|
||||
eSBSb290IEUxMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAE3m/4fxzf7flHh4axpMCK
|
||||
+IKXgOqPyEpeKn2IaKcBYhSRJHpcnqMXfYqGITQYUBsQ3tA3SybHGWCA6TS9YBk2
|
||||
QNYphwk8kXr2vBMj3VlOBF7PyAIcGFPBMdjaIOlEjeR2o0IwQDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8E
|
||||
BAMCAQYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU8ygYy2R17ikq6+2uI1g4
|
||||
hevIIgcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMDaAAwZQIxALGOWiDDshliTd6wT99u0nCK8Z9+aozm
|
||||
ut6Dacpps6kFtZaSF4fC0urQe87YQVt8rgIwRt7qy12a7DLCZRawTDBcMPPaTnOG
|
||||
BtjOiQRINzf43TNRnXCve1XYAS59BWQOhriR
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=US/O=Certainly/CN=Certainly Root R1
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
8e:0f:f9:4b:90:71:68:65:33:54:f4:d4:44:39:b7:e0
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Apr 1 00:00:00 2021 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Apr 1 00:00:00 2046 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=US, O=Certainly, CN=Certainly Root R1
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
E0:AA:3F:25:8D:9F:44:5C:C1:3A:E8:2E:AE:77:4C:84:3E:67:0C:F4
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=A0:50:EE:0F:28:71:F4:27:B2:12:6D:6F:50:96:25:BA:CC:86:42:AF
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=77:B8:2C:D8:64:4C:43:05:F7:AC:C5:CB:15:6B:45:67:50:04:03:3D:51:C6:0C:62:02:A8:E0:C3:34:67:D3:A0
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIFRzCCAy+gAwIBAgIRAI4P+UuQcWhlM1T01EQ5t+AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
||||
PTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEjAQBgNVBAoTCUNlcnRhaW5seTEaMBgGA1UEAxMRQ2Vy
|
||||
dGFpbmx5IFJvb3QgUjEwHhcNMjEwNDAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNDYwNDAxMDAwMDAwWjA9
|
||||
MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzESMBAGA1UEChMJQ2VydGFpbmx5MRowGAYDVQQDExFDZXJ0
|
||||
YWlubHkgUm9vdCBSMTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIPADCCAgoCggIBANA2
|
||||
1B/q3avk0bbm+yLA3RMNansiExyXPGhjZjKcA7WNpIGD2ngwEc/csiu+kr+O5MQT
|
||||
vqRoTNoCaBZ0vrLdBORrKt03H2As2/X3oXyVtwxwhi7xOu9S98zTm/mLvg7fMbed
|
||||
aFySpvXl8wo0tf97ouSHocavFwDvA5HtqRxOcT3Si2yJ9HiG5mpJoM610rCrm/b0
|
||||
1C7jcvk2xusVtyWMOvwlDbMicyF0yEqWYZL1LwsYpfSt4u5BvQF5+paMjRcCMLT5
|
||||
r3gajLQ2EBAHBXDQ9DGQilHFhiZ5shGIXsXwClTNSaa/ApzSRKft43jvRl5tcdF5
|
||||
cBxGX1HpyTfcX35pe0HfNEXgO4T0oYoKNp43zGJS4YkNKPl6I7ENPT2a/Z2B7yyQ
|
||||
wHtETrtJ4A5KVpK8y7XdeReJkd5hiXSSqOMyhb5OhaRLWcsrxXiOcVTQAjeZjOVJ
|
||||
6uBUcqQRBi8LjMFbvrWhsFNunLhgkR9Za/kt9JQKl7XsxXYDVBtlUrpMklZRNaBA
|
||||
2CnbrlJ2Oy0wQJuK0EJWtLeIAaSHO1OWzaMWj/Nmqhexx2DgwUMFDO6bW2BvBlyH
|
||||
Wyf5QBGenDPBt+U1VwV/J84XIIwc/PH72jEpSe31C4SnT8H2TsIonPru4K8H+zMR
|
||||
eiFPCyEQtkA6qyI6BJyLm4SGcprSp6XEtHWRqSsjAgMBAAGjQjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB
|
||||
/wQEAwIBBjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTgqj8ljZ9EXME66C6u
|
||||
d0yEPmcM9DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAgEAuVevuBLaV4OPaAszHQNTVfSVcOQr
|
||||
PbA56/qJYv331hgELyE03fFo8NWWWt7CgKPBjcZq91l3rhVkz1t5BXdm6ozTaw3d
|
||||
8VkswTOlMIAVRQdFGjEitpIAq5lNOo93r6kiyi9jyhXWx8bwPWz8HA2YEGGeEaIi
|
||||
1wrykXprOQ4vMMM2SZ/g6Q8CRFA3lFV96p/2O7qUpUzpvD5RtOjKkjZUbVwlKNrd
|
||||
rRT90+7iIgXr0PK3aBLXWopBGsaSpVo7Y0VPv+E6dyIvXL9G+VoDhRNCX8reU9di
|
||||
taY1BMJH/5n9hN9czulegChB8n3nHpDYT3Y+gjwN/KUD+nsa2UUeYNrEjvn8K8l7
|
||||
lcUq/6qJ34IxD3L/DCfXCh5WAFAeDJDBlrXYFIW7pw0WwfgHJBu6haEaBQmAupVj
|
||||
yTrsJZ9/nbqkRxWbRHDxakvWOF5D8xh+UG7pWijmZeZ3Gzr9Hb4DJqPb1OG7fpYn
|
||||
Kx3upPvaJVQTA945xsMfTZDsjxtK0hzthZU4UHlG1sGQUDGpXJpuHfUzVounmdLy
|
||||
yCwzk5Iwx06MZTMQZBf9JBeW0Y3COmor6xOLRPIh80oat3df1+2IpHLlOR+Vnb5n
|
||||
wXARPbv0+Em34yaXOp/SX3z7wJl8OSngex2/DaeP0ik0biQVy96QXr8axGbqwua6
|
||||
OV+KmalBWQewLK8=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### certSIGN
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=RO/O=certSIGN/OU=certSIGN ROOT CA
|
||||
|
|
@ -1193,6 +1280,61 @@ W9c3rkIO3aQab3yIVMUWbuF6aC74Or8NpDyJO3inTmODBCEIZ43ygknQW/2xzQ+D
|
|||
hNQ+IIX3Sj0rnP0qCglN6oH4EZw=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Comodo CA Limited
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Comodo CA Limited/CN=AAA Certificate Services
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number: 1 (0x1)
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Jan 1 00:00:00 2004 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 2028 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Comodo CA Limited, CN=AAA Certificate Services
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
A0:11:0A:23:3E:96:F1:07:EC:E2:AF:29:EF:82:A5:7F:D0:30:A4:B4
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
|
||||
|
||||
Full Name:
|
||||
URI:http://crl.comodoca.com/AAACertificateServices.crl
|
||||
|
||||
Full Name:
|
||||
URI:http://crl.comodo.net/AAACertificateServices.crl
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=D1:EB:23:A4:6D:17:D6:8F:D9:25:64:C2:F1:F1:60:17:64:D8:E3:49
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=D7:A7:A0:FB:5D:7E:27:31:D7:71:E9:48:4E:BC:DE:F7:1D:5F:0C:3E:0A:29:48:78:2B:C8:3E:E0:EA:69:9E:F4
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIEMjCCAxqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADB7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEb
|
||||
MBkGA1UECAwSR3JlYXRlciBNYW5jaGVzdGVyMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdTYWxmb3JkMRow
|
||||
GAYDVQQKDBFDb21vZG8gQ0EgTGltaXRlZDEhMB8GA1UEAwwYQUFBIENlcnRpZmlj
|
||||
YXRlIFNlcnZpY2VzMB4XDTA0MDEwMTAwMDAwMFoXDTI4MTIzMTIzNTk1OVowezEL
|
||||
MAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxGzAZBgNVBAgMEkdyZWF0ZXIgTWFuY2hlc3RlcjEQMA4GA1UE
|
||||
BwwHU2FsZm9yZDEaMBgGA1UECgwRQ29tb2RvIENBIExpbWl0ZWQxITAfBgNVBAMM
|
||||
GEFBQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
||||
ADCCAQoCggEBAL5AnfRu4ep2hxxNRUSOvkbIgwadwSr+GB+O5AL686tdUIoWMQua
|
||||
BtDFcCLNSS1UY8y2bmhGC1Pqy0wkwLxyTurxFa70VJoSCsN6sjNg4tqJVfMiWPPe
|
||||
3M/vg4aijJRPn2jymJBGhCfHdr/jzDUsi14HZGWCwEiwqJH5YZ92IFCokcdmtet4
|
||||
YgNW8IoaE+oxox6gmf049vYnMlhvB/VruPsUK6+3qszWY19zjNoFmag4qMsXeDZR
|
||||
rOme9Hg6jc8P2ULimAyrL58OAd7vn5lJ8S3frHRNG5i1R8XlKdH5kBjHYpy+g8cm
|
||||
ez6KJcfA3Z3mNWgQIJ2P2N7Sw4ScDV7oL8kCAwEAAaOBwDCBvTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
||||
oBEKIz6W8Qfs4q8p74Klf9AwpLQwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQF
|
||||
MAMBAf8wewYDVR0fBHQwcjA4oDagNIYyaHR0cDovL2NybC5jb21vZG9jYS5jb20v
|
||||
QUFBQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVTZXJ2aWNlcy5jcmwwNqA0oDKGMGh0dHA6Ly9jcmwuY29t
|
||||
b2RvLm5ldC9BQUFDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZVNlcnZpY2VzLmNybDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUF
|
||||
AAOCAQEACFb8AvCb6P+k+tZ7xkSAzk/ExfYAWMymtrwUSWgEdujm7l3sAg9g1o1Q
|
||||
GE8mTgHj5rCl7r+8dFRBv/38ErjHT1r0iWAFf2C3BUrz9vHCv8S5dIa2LX1rzNLz
|
||||
Rt0vxuBqw8M0Ayx9lt1awg6nCpnBBYurDC/zXDrPbDdVCYfeU0BsWO/8tqtlbgT2
|
||||
G9w84FoVxp7Z8VlIMCFlA2zs6SFz7JsDoeA3raAVGI/6ugLOpyypEBMs1OUIJqsi
|
||||
l2D4kF501KKaU73yqWjgom7C12yxow+ev+to51byrvLjKzg6CYG1a4XXvi3tPxq3
|
||||
smPi9WIsgtRqAEFQ8TmDn5XpNpaYbg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### COMODO CA Limited
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO Certification Authority
|
||||
|
|
@ -1336,61 +1478,6 @@ QOhTsiedSrnAdyGN/4fy3ryM7xfft0kL0fJuMAsaDk527RH89elWsn2/x20Kk4yl
|
|||
NVOFBkpdn627G190
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Comodo CA Limited
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Comodo CA Limited/CN=AAA Certificate Services
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number: 1 (0x1)
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Jan 1 00:00:00 2004 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 2028 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Comodo CA Limited, CN=AAA Certificate Services
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
A0:11:0A:23:3E:96:F1:07:EC:E2:AF:29:EF:82:A5:7F:D0:30:A4:B4
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
|
||||
|
||||
Full Name:
|
||||
URI:http://crl.comodoca.com/AAACertificateServices.crl
|
||||
|
||||
Full Name:
|
||||
URI:http://crl.comodo.net/AAACertificateServices.crl
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=D1:EB:23:A4:6D:17:D6:8F:D9:25:64:C2:F1:F1:60:17:64:D8:E3:49
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=D7:A7:A0:FB:5D:7E:27:31:D7:71:E9:48:4E:BC:DE:F7:1D:5F:0C:3E:0A:29:48:78:2B:C8:3E:E0:EA:69:9E:F4
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIEMjCCAxqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADB7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEb
|
||||
MBkGA1UECAwSR3JlYXRlciBNYW5jaGVzdGVyMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdTYWxmb3JkMRow
|
||||
GAYDVQQKDBFDb21vZG8gQ0EgTGltaXRlZDEhMB8GA1UEAwwYQUFBIENlcnRpZmlj
|
||||
YXRlIFNlcnZpY2VzMB4XDTA0MDEwMTAwMDAwMFoXDTI4MTIzMTIzNTk1OVowezEL
|
||||
MAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxGzAZBgNVBAgMEkdyZWF0ZXIgTWFuY2hlc3RlcjEQMA4GA1UE
|
||||
BwwHU2FsZm9yZDEaMBgGA1UECgwRQ29tb2RvIENBIExpbWl0ZWQxITAfBgNVBAMM
|
||||
GEFBQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTZXJ2aWNlczCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
||||
ADCCAQoCggEBAL5AnfRu4ep2hxxNRUSOvkbIgwadwSr+GB+O5AL686tdUIoWMQua
|
||||
BtDFcCLNSS1UY8y2bmhGC1Pqy0wkwLxyTurxFa70VJoSCsN6sjNg4tqJVfMiWPPe
|
||||
3M/vg4aijJRPn2jymJBGhCfHdr/jzDUsi14HZGWCwEiwqJH5YZ92IFCokcdmtet4
|
||||
YgNW8IoaE+oxox6gmf049vYnMlhvB/VruPsUK6+3qszWY19zjNoFmag4qMsXeDZR
|
||||
rOme9Hg6jc8P2ULimAyrL58OAd7vn5lJ8S3frHRNG5i1R8XlKdH5kBjHYpy+g8cm
|
||||
ez6KJcfA3Z3mNWgQIJ2P2N7Sw4ScDV7oL8kCAwEAAaOBwDCBvTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
||||
oBEKIz6W8Qfs4q8p74Klf9AwpLQwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQF
|
||||
MAMBAf8wewYDVR0fBHQwcjA4oDagNIYyaHR0cDovL2NybC5jb21vZG9jYS5jb20v
|
||||
QUFBQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVTZXJ2aWNlcy5jcmwwNqA0oDKGMGh0dHA6Ly9jcmwuY29t
|
||||
b2RvLm5ldC9BQUFDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZVNlcnZpY2VzLmNybDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUF
|
||||
AAOCAQEACFb8AvCb6P+k+tZ7xkSAzk/ExfYAWMymtrwUSWgEdujm7l3sAg9g1o1Q
|
||||
GE8mTgHj5rCl7r+8dFRBv/38ErjHT1r0iWAFf2C3BUrz9vHCv8S5dIa2LX1rzNLz
|
||||
Rt0vxuBqw8M0Ayx9lt1awg6nCpnBBYurDC/zXDrPbDdVCYfeU0BsWO/8tqtlbgT2
|
||||
G9w84FoVxp7Z8VlIMCFlA2zs6SFz7JsDoeA3raAVGI/6ugLOpyypEBMs1OUIJqsi
|
||||
l2D4kF501KKaU73yqWjgom7C12yxow+ev+to51byrvLjKzg6CYG1a4XXvi3tPxq3
|
||||
smPi9WIsgtRqAEFQ8TmDn5XpNpaYbg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### D-Trust GmbH
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=DE/O=D-Trust GmbH/CN=D-TRUST BR Root CA 1 2020
|
||||
|
|
@ -2058,6 +2145,94 @@ r/OSmbaz5mEP0oUA51Aa5BuVnRmhuZyxm7EAHu/QD09CbMkKvO5D+jpxpchNJqU1
|
|||
gKDWHrO8Dw9TdSmq6hN35N6MgSGtBxBHEa2HPQfRdbzP82Z+
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### DigiCert, Inc.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=US/O=DigiCert, Inc./CN=DigiCert TLS ECC P384 Root G5
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
09:e0:93:65:ac:f7:d9:c8:b9:3e:1c:0b:04:2a:2e:f3
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Jan 15 00:00:00 2021 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Jan 14 23:59:59 2046 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=US, O=DigiCert, Inc., CN=DigiCert TLS ECC P384 Root G5
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
C1:51:45:50:59:AB:3E:E7:2C:5A:FA:20:22:12:07:80:88:7C:11:6A
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=17:F3:DE:5E:9F:0F:19:E9:8E:F6:1F:32:26:6E:20:C4:07:AE:30:EE
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=01:8E:13:F0:77:25:32:CF:80:9B:D1:B1:72:81:86:72:83:FC:48:C6:E1:3B:E9:C6:98:12:85:4A:49:0C:1B:05
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIICGTCCAZ+gAwIBAgIQCeCTZaz32ci5PhwLBCou8zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAzBOMQsw
|
||||
CQYDVQQGEwJVUzEXMBUGA1UEChMORGlnaUNlcnQsIEluYy4xJjAkBgNVBAMTHURp
|
||||
Z2lDZXJ0IFRMUyBFQ0MgUDM4NCBSb290IEc1MB4XDTIxMDExNTAwMDAwMFoXDTQ2
|
||||
MDExNDIzNTk1OVowTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDkRpZ2lDZXJ0LCBJ
|
||||
bmMuMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1EaWdpQ2VydCBUTFMgRUNDIFAzODQgUm9vdCBHNTB2MBAG
|
||||
ByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABMFEoc8Rl1Ca3iOCNQfN0MsYndLxf3c1TzvdlHJS
|
||||
7cI7+Oz6e2tYIOyZrsn8aLN1udsJ7MgT9U7GCh1mMEy7H0cKPGEQQil8pQgO4CLp
|
||||
0zVozptjn4S1mU1YoI71VOeVyaNCMEAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMFRRVBZqz7nLFr6ICIS
|
||||
B4CIfBFqMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBhjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAoGCCqGSM49
|
||||
BAMDA2gAMGUCMQCJao1H5+z8blUD2WdsJk6Dxv3J+ysTvLd6jLRl0mlpYxNjOyZQ
|
||||
LgGheQaRnUi/wr4CMEfDFXuxoJGZSZOoPHzoRgaLLPIxAJSdYsiJvRmEFOml+wG4
|
||||
DXZDjC5Ty3zfDBeWUA==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=US/O=DigiCert, Inc./CN=DigiCert TLS RSA4096 Root G5
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
08:f9:b4:78:a8:fa:7e:da:6a:33:37:89:de:7c:cf:8a
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Jan 15 00:00:00 2021 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Jan 14 23:59:59 2046 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=US, O=DigiCert, Inc., CN=DigiCert TLS RSA4096 Root G5
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
51:33:1C:ED:36:40:AF:17:D3:25:CD:69:68:F2:AF:4E:23:3E:B3:41
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=A7:88:49:DC:5D:7C:75:8C:8C:DE:39:98:56:B3:AA:D0:B2:A5:71:35
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=37:1A:00:DC:05:33:B3:72:1A:7E:EB:40:E8:41:9E:70:79:9D:2B:0A:0F:2C:1D:80:69:31:65:F7:CE:C4:AD:75
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIFZjCCA06gAwIBAgIQCPm0eKj6ftpqMzeJ3nzPijANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQwFADBN
|
||||
MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEXMBUGA1UEChMORGlnaUNlcnQsIEluYy4xJTAjBgNVBAMT
|
||||
HERpZ2lDZXJ0IFRMUyBSU0E0MDk2IFJvb3QgRzUwHhcNMjEwMTE1MDAwMDAwWhcN
|
||||
NDYwMTE0MjM1OTU5WjBNMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEXMBUGA1UEChMORGlnaUNlcnQs
|
||||
IEluYy4xJTAjBgNVBAMTHERpZ2lDZXJ0IFRMUyBSU0E0MDk2IFJvb3QgRzUwggIi
|
||||
MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAwggIKAoICAQCz0PTJeRGd/fxmgefM1eS87IE+
|
||||
ajWOLrfn3q/5B03PMJ3qCQuZvWxX2hhKuHisOjmopkisLnLlvevxGs3npAOpPxG0
|
||||
2C+JFvuUAT27L/gTBaF4HI4o4EXgg/RZG5Wzrn4DReW+wkL+7vI8toUTmDKdFqgp
|
||||
wgscONyfMXdcvyej/Cestyu9dJsXLfKB2l2w4SMXPohKEiPQ6s+d3gMXsUJKoBZM
|
||||
pG2T6T867jp8nVid9E6P/DsjyG244gXazOvswzH016cpVIDPRFtMbzCe88zdH5RD
|
||||
nU1/cHAN1DrRN/BsnZvAFJNY781BOHW8EwOVfH/jXOnVDdXifBBiqmvwPXbzP6Po
|
||||
sMH976pXTayGpxi0KcEsDr9kvimM2AItzVwv8n/vFfQMFawKsPHTDU9qTXeXAaDx
|
||||
Zre3zu/O7Oyldcqs4+Fj97ihBMi8ez9dLRYiVu1ISf6nL3kwJZu6ay0/nTvEF+cd
|
||||
Lvvyz6b84xQslpghjLSR6Rlgg/IwKwZzUNWYOwbpx4oMYIwo+FKbbuH2TbsGJJvX
|
||||
KyY//SovcfXWJL5/MZ4PbeiPT02jP/816t9JXkGPhvnxd3lLG7SjXi/7RgLQZhNe
|
||||
XoVPzthwiHvOAbWWl9fNff2C+MIkwcoBOU+NosEUQB+cZtUMCUbW8tDRSHZWOkPL
|
||||
tgoRObqME2wGtZ7P6wIDAQABo0IwQDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUUTMc7TZArxfTJc1paPKv
|
||||
TiM+s0EwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgGGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcN
|
||||
AQEMBQADggIBAGCmr1tfV9qJ20tQqcQjNSH/0GEwhJG3PxDPJY7Jv0Y02cEhJhxw
|
||||
GXIeo8mH/qlDZJY6yFMECrZBu8RHANmfGBg7sg7zNOok992vIGCukihfNudd5N7H
|
||||
PNtQOa27PShNlnx2xlv0wdsUpasZYgcYQF+Xkdycx6u1UQ3maVNVzDl92sURVXLF
|
||||
O4uJ+DQtpBflF+aZfTCIITfNMBc9uPK8qHWgQ9w+iUuQrm0D4ByjoJYJu32jtyoQ
|
||||
REtGBzRj7TG5BO6jm5qu5jF49OokYTurWGT/u4cnYiWB39yhL/btp/96j1EuMPik
|
||||
AdKFOV8BmZZvWltwGUb+hmA+rYAQCd05JS9Yf7vSdPD3Rh9GOUrYU9DzLjtxpdRv
|
||||
/PNn5AeP3SYZ4Y1b+qOTEZvpyDrDVWiakuFSdjjo4bq9+0/V77PnSIMx8IIh47a+
|
||||
p6tv75/fTM8BuGJqIz3nCU2AG3swpMPdB380vqQmsvZB6Akd4yCYqjdP//fx4ilw
|
||||
MUc/dNAUFvohigLVigmUdy7yWSiLfFCSCmZ4OIN1xLVaqBHG5cGdZlXPU8Sv13WF
|
||||
qUITVuwhd4GTWgzqltlJyqEI8pc7bZsEGCREjnwB8twl2F6GmrE52/WRMmrRpnCK
|
||||
ovfepEWFJqgejF0pW8hL2JpqA15w8oVPbEtoL8pU9ozaMv7Da4M/OMZ+
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Disig a.s.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=SK/L=Bratislava/O=Disig a.s./CN=CA Disig Root R2
|
||||
|
|
@ -2170,65 +2345,104 @@ aFvowdlxfv1k7/9nR4hYJS8+hge9+6jlgqispdNpQ80xiEmEU5LAsTkbOYMBMMTy
|
|||
qfrQA71yN2BWHzZ8vTmR9W0Nv3vXkg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### E-Tu\U011Fra EBG Bili\U015Fim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.\U015E.
|
||||
### E-Tugra EBG A.S.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=TR/L=Ankara/O=E-Tu\xC4\x9Fra EBG Bili\xC5\x9Fim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.\xC5\x9E./OU=E-Tugra Sertifikasyon Merkezi/CN=E-Tugra Certification Authority
|
||||
=== /C=TR/L=Ankara/O=E-Tugra EBG A.S./OU=E-Tugra Trust Center/CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA ECC v3
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number: 7667447206703254355 (0x6a683e9c519bcb53)
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
26:46:19:77:31:e1:4f:6f:28:36:de:39:51:86:e6:d4:97:88:22:c1
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Mar 5 12:09:48 2013 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Mar 3 12:09:48 2023 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tu\xC4\x9Fra EBG Bili\xC5\x9Fim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.\xC5\x9E., OU=E-Tugra Sertifikasyon Merkezi, CN=E-Tugra Certification Authority
|
||||
Not Before: Mar 18 09:46:58 2020 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Mar 12 09:46:58 2045 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tugra EBG A.S., OU=E-Tugra Trust Center, CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA ECC v3
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
2E:E3:DB:B2:49:D0:9C:54:79:5C:FA:27:2A:FE:CC:4E:D2:E8:4E:54
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
|
||||
keyid:2E:E3:DB:B2:49:D0:9C:54:79:5C:FA:27:2A:FE:CC:4E:D2:E8:4E:54
|
||||
keyid:FF:82:31:72:3E:F9:C4:66:6C:AD:38:9E:D1:B0:51:88:A5:90:CC:F5
|
||||
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
FF:82:31:72:3E:F9:C4:66:6C:AD:38:9E:D1:B0:51:88:A5:90:CC:F5
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=51:C6:E7:08:49:06:6E:F3:92:D4:5C:A0:0D:6D:A3:62:8F:C3:52:39
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=B0:BF:D5:2B:B0:D7:D9:BD:92:BF:5D:4D:C1:3D:A2:55:C0:2C:54:2F:37:83:65:EA:89:39:11:F5:5E:55:F2:3C
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=8A:2F:AF:57:53:B1:B0:E6:A1:04:EC:5B:6A:69:71:6D:F6:1C:E2:84
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=87:3F:46:85:FA:7F:56:36:25:25:2E:6D:36:BC:D7:F1:6F:C2:49:51:F2:64:E4:7E:1B:95:4F:49:08:CD:CA:13
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIGSzCCBDOgAwIBAgIIamg+nFGby1MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwgbIxCzAJBgNV
|
||||
BAYTAlRSMQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZBbmthcmExQDA+BgNVBAoMN0UtVHXEn3JhIEVCRyBC
|
||||
aWxpxZ9pbSBUZWtub2xvamlsZXJpIHZlIEhpem1ldGxlcmkgQS7Fni4xJjAkBgNV
|
||||
BAsMHUUtVHVncmEgU2VydGlmaWthc3lvbiBNZXJrZXppMSgwJgYDVQQDDB9FLVR1
|
||||
Z3JhIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTEzMDMwNTEyMDk0OFoXDTIz
|
||||
MDMwMzEyMDk0OFowgbIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlRSMQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZBbmthcmExQDA+
|
||||
BgNVBAoMN0UtVHXEn3JhIEVCRyBCaWxpxZ9pbSBUZWtub2xvamlsZXJpIHZlIEhp
|
||||
em1ldGxlcmkgQS7Fni4xJjAkBgNVBAsMHUUtVHVncmEgU2VydGlmaWthc3lvbiBN
|
||||
ZXJrZXppMSgwJgYDVQQDDB9FLVR1Z3JhIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5
|
||||
MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA4vU/kwVRHoViVF56C/UY
|
||||
B4Oufq9899SKa6VjQzm5S/fDxmSJPZQuVIBSOTkHS0vdhQd2h8y/L5VMzH2nPbxH
|
||||
D5hw+IyFHnSOkm0bQNGZDbt1bsipa5rAhDGvykPL6ys06I+XawGb1Q5KCKpbknSF
|
||||
Q9OArqGIW66z6l7LFpp3RMih9lRozt6Plyu6W0ACDGQXwLWTzeHxE2bODHnv0ZEo
|
||||
q1+gElIwcxmOj+GMB6LDu0rw6h8VqO4lzKRG+Bsi77MOQ7osJLjFLFzUHPhdZL3D
|
||||
k14opz8n8Y4e0ypQBaNV2cvnOVPAmJ6MVGKLJrD3fY185MaeZkJVgkfnsliNZvcH
|
||||
fC425lAcP9tDJMW/hkd5s3kc91r0E+xs+D/iWR+V7kI+ua2oMoVJl0b+SzGPWsut
|
||||
dEcf6ZG33ygEIqDUD13ieU/qbIWGvaimzuT6w+Gzrt48Ue7LE3wBf4QOXVGUnhMM
|
||||
ti6lTPk5cDZvlsouDERVxcr6XQKj39ZkjFqzAQqptQpHF//vkUAqjqFGOjGY5RH8
|
||||
zLtJVor8udBhmm9lbObDyz51Sf6Pp+KJxWfXnUYTTjF2OySznhFlhqt/7x3U+Lzn
|
||||
rFpct1pHXFXOVbQicVtbC/DP3KBhZOqp12gKY6fgDT+gr9Oq0n7vUaDmUStVkhUX
|
||||
U8u3Zg5mTPj5dUyQ5xJwx0UCAwEAAaNjMGEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFC7j27JJ0JxUeVz6
|
||||
Jyr+zE7S6E5UMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAULuPbsknQnFR5
|
||||
XPonKv7MTtLoTlQwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4ICAQAF
|
||||
Nzr0TbdF4kV1JI+2d1LoHNgQk2Xz8lkGpD4eKexd0dCrfOAKkEh47U6YA5n+KGCR
|
||||
HTAduGN8qOY1tfrTYXbm1gdLymmasoR6d5NFFxWfJNCYExL/u6Au/U5Mh/jOXKqY
|
||||
GwXgAEZKgoClM4so3O0409/lPun++1ndYYRP0lSWE2ETPo+Aab6TR7U1Q9Jauz1c
|
||||
77NCR807VRMGsAnb/WP2OogKmW9+4c4bU2pEZiNRCHu8W1Ki/QY3OEBhj0qWuJA3
|
||||
+GbHeJAAFS6LrVE1Uweoa2iu+U48BybNCAVwzDk/dr2l02cmAYamU9JgO3xDf1WK
|
||||
vJUawSg5TB9D0pH0clmKuVb8P7Sd2nCcdlqMQ1DujjByTd//SffGqWfZbawCEeI6
|
||||
FiWnWAjLb1NBnEg4R2gz0dfHj9R0IdTDBZB6/86WiLEVKV0jq9BgoRJP3vQXzTLl
|
||||
yb/IQ639Lo7xr+L0mPoSHyDYwKcMhcWQ9DstliaxLL5Mq+ux0orJ23gTDx4JnW2P
|
||||
AJ8C2sH6H3p6CcRK5ogql5+Ji/03X186zjhZhkuvcQu02PJwT58yE+Owp1fl2tpD
|
||||
y4Q08ijE6m30Ku/Ba3ba+367hTzSU8JNvnHhRdH9I2cNE3X7z2VnIp2usAnRCf8d
|
||||
NL/+I5c30jn6PQ0GC7TbO6Orb1wdtn7os4I07QZcJA==
|
||||
MIICpTCCAiqgAwIBAgIUJkYZdzHhT28oNt45UYbm1JeIIsEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMw
|
||||
gYAxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlRSMQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZBbmthcmExGTAXBgNVBAoTEEUtVHVn
|
||||
cmEgRUJHIEEuUy4xHTAbBgNVBAsTFEUtVHVncmEgVHJ1c3QgQ2VudGVyMSYwJAYD
|
||||
VQQDEx1FLVR1Z3JhIEdsb2JhbCBSb290IENBIEVDQyB2MzAeFw0yMDAzMTgwOTQ2
|
||||
NThaFw00NTAzMTIwOTQ2NThaMIGAMQswCQYDVQQGEwJUUjEPMA0GA1UEBxMGQW5r
|
||||
YXJhMRkwFwYDVQQKExBFLVR1Z3JhIEVCRyBBLlMuMR0wGwYDVQQLExRFLVR1Z3Jh
|
||||
IFRydXN0IENlbnRlcjEmMCQGA1UEAxMdRS1UdWdyYSBHbG9iYWwgUm9vdCBDQSBF
|
||||
Q0MgdjMwdjAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAIgNiAASOmCm/xxAeJ9urA8woLNheSBkQ
|
||||
KczLWYHMjLiSF4mDKpL2w6QdTGLVn9agRtwcvHbB40fQWxPa56WzZkjnIZpKT4YK
|
||||
fWzqTTKACrJ6CZtpS5iB4i7sAnCWH/31Rs7K3IKjYzBhMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMB
|
||||
Af8wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU/4Ixcj75xGZsrTie0bBRiKWQzPUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFP+C
|
||||
MXI++cRmbK04ntGwUYilkMz1MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAwNp
|
||||
ADBmAjEA5gVYaWHlLcoNy/EZCL3W/VGSGn5jVASQkZo1kTmZ+gepZpO6yGjUij/6
|
||||
7W4WAie3AjEA3VoXK3YdZUKWpqxdinlW2Iob35reX8dQj7FbcQwm32pAAOwzkSFx
|
||||
vmjkI6TZraE3
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=TR/L=Ankara/O=E-Tugra EBG A.S./OU=E-Tugra Trust Center/CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA RSA v3
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
0d:4d:c5:cd:16:22:95:96:08:7e:b8:0b:7f:15:06:34:fb:79:10:34
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Mar 18 09:07:17 2020 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Mar 12 09:07:17 2045 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tugra EBG A.S., OU=E-Tugra Trust Center, CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA RSA v3
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
|
||||
keyid:B2:B4:AE:E6:2D:F7:26:D5:AA:75:2D:76:4B:C0:1B:53:21:D0:48:EF
|
||||
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
B2:B4:AE:E6:2D:F7:26:D5:AA:75:2D:76:4B:C0:1B:53:21:D0:48:EF
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=E9:A8:5D:22:14:52:1C:5B:AA:0A:B4:BE:24:6A:23:8A:C9:BA:E2:A9
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=EF:66:B0:B1:0A:3C:DB:9F:2E:36:48:C7:6B:D2:AF:18:EA:D2:BF:E6:F1:17:65:5E:28:C4:06:0D:A1:A3:F4:C2
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIF8zCCA9ugAwIBAgIUDU3FzRYilZYIfrgLfxUGNPt5EDQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
|
||||
BQAwgYAxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlRSMQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZBbmthcmExGTAXBgNVBAoTEEUt
|
||||
VHVncmEgRUJHIEEuUy4xHTAbBgNVBAsTFEUtVHVncmEgVHJ1c3QgQ2VudGVyMSYw
|
||||
JAYDVQQDEx1FLVR1Z3JhIEdsb2JhbCBSb290IENBIFJTQSB2MzAeFw0yMDAzMTgw
|
||||
OTA3MTdaFw00NTAzMTIwOTA3MTdaMIGAMQswCQYDVQQGEwJUUjEPMA0GA1UEBxMG
|
||||
QW5rYXJhMRkwFwYDVQQKExBFLVR1Z3JhIEVCRyBBLlMuMR0wGwYDVQQLExRFLVR1
|
||||
Z3JhIFRydXN0IENlbnRlcjEmMCQGA1UEAxMdRS1UdWdyYSBHbG9iYWwgUm9vdCBD
|
||||
QSBSU0EgdjMwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAwggIKAoICAQCiZvCJt3J7
|
||||
7gnJY9LTQ91ew6aEOErxjYG7FL1H6EAX8z3DeEVypi6Q3po61CBxyryfHUuXCscx
|
||||
uj7X/iWpKo429NEvx7epXTPcMHD4QGxLsqYxYdE0PD0xesevxKenhOGXpOhL9hd8
|
||||
7jwH7eKKV9y2+/hDJVDqJ4GohryPUkqWOmAalrv9c/SF/YP9f4RtNGx/ardLAQO/
|
||||
rWm31zLZ9Vdq6YaCPqVmMbMWPcLzJmAy01IesGykNz709a/r4d+ABs8qQedmCeFL
|
||||
l+d3vSFtKbZnwy1+7dZ5ZdHPOrbRsV5WYVB6Ws5OUDGAA5hH5+QYfERaxqSzO8bG
|
||||
wzrwbMOLyKSRBfP12baqBqG3q+Sx6iEUXIOk/P+2UNOMEiaZdnDpwA+mdPy70Bt4
|
||||
znKS4iicvObpCdg604nmvi533wEKb5b25Y08TVJ2Glbhc34XrD2tbKNSEhhw5oBO
|
||||
M/J+JjKsBY04pOZ2PJ8QaQ5tndLBeSBrW88zjdGUdjXnXVXHt6woq0bM5zshtQoK
|
||||
5EpZ3IE1S0SVEgpnpaH/WwAH0sDM+T/8nzPyAPiMbIedBi3x7+PmBvrFZhNb/FAH
|
||||
nnGGstpvdDDPk1Po3CLW3iAfYY2jLqN4MpBs3KwytQXk9TwzDdbgh3cXTJ2w2Amo
|
||||
DVf3RIXwyAS+XF1a4xeOVGNpf0l0ZAWMowIDAQABo2MwYTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTAD
|
||||
AQH/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLK0ruYt9ybVqnUtdkvAG1Mh0EjvMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSy
|
||||
tK7mLfcm1ap1LXZLwBtTIdBI7zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
|
||||
BQADggIBAImocn+M684uGMQQgC0QDP/7FM0E4BQ8Tpr7nym/Ip5XuYJzEmMmtcyQ
|
||||
6dIqKe6cLcwsmb5FJ+Sxce3kOJUxQfJ9emN438o2Fi+CiJ+8EUdPdk3ILY7r3y18
|
||||
Tjvarvbj2l0Upq7ohUSdBm6O++96SmotKygY/r+QLHUWnw/qln0F7psTpURs+APQ
|
||||
3SPh/QMSEgj0GDSz4DcLdxEBSL9htLX4GdnLTeqjjO/98Aa1bZL0SmFQhO3sSdPk
|
||||
vmjmLuMxC1QLGpLWgti2omU8ZgT5Vdps+9u1FGZNlIM7zR6mK7L+d0CGq+ffCsn9
|
||||
9t2HVhjYsCxVYJb6CH5SkPVLpi6HfMsg2wY+oF0Dd32iPBMbKaITVaA9FCKvb7jQ
|
||||
mhty3QUBjYZgv6Rn7rWlDdF/5horYmbDB7rnoEgcOMPpRfunf/ztAmgayncSd6YA
|
||||
VSgU7NbHEqIbZULpkejLPoeJVF3Zr52XnGnnCv8PWniLYypMfUeUP95L6VPQMPHF
|
||||
9p5J3zugkaOj/s1YzOrfr28oO6Bpm4/srK4rVJ2bBLFHIK+WEj5jlB0E5y67hscM
|
||||
moi/dkfv97ALl2bSRM9gUgfh1SxKOidhd8rXj+eHDjD/DLsE4mHDosiXYY60MGo8
|
||||
bcIHX0pzLz/5FooBZu+6kcpSV3uu1OYP3Qt6f4ueJiDPO++BcYNZ
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### eMudhra Inc
|
||||
|
|
@ -3471,61 +3685,6 @@ pcw72Hc3MKJP2W/R8kCtQXoXxdZKNYm3QdV8hn9VTYNKpXMgwDqvkPGaJI7ZjnHK
|
|||
e7iG2rKPmT4dEw0SEe7Uq/DpFXYC5ODfqiAeW2GFZECpkJcNrVPSWh2HagCXZWK0
|
||||
vm9qp/UsQu0yrbYhnr68
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=GR/O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority/CN=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Dec 6 13:49:52 2011 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 1 13:49:52 2031 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=GR, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority, CN=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage:
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
A6:91:42:FD:13:61:4A:23:9E:08:A4:29:E5:D8:13:04:23:EE:41:25
|
||||
X509v3 Name Constraints:
|
||||
Permitted:
|
||||
DNS:.gr
|
||||
DNS:.eu
|
||||
DNS:.edu
|
||||
DNS:.org
|
||||
email:.gr
|
||||
email:.eu
|
||||
email:.edu
|
||||
email:.org
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=FE:45:65:9B:79:03:5B:98:A1:61:B5:51:2E:AC:DA:58:09:48:22:4D
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=BC:10:4F:15:A4:8B:E7:09:DC:A5:42:A7:E1:D4:B9:DF:6F:05:45:27:E8:02:EA:A9:2D:59:54:44:25:8A:FE:71
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIEMTCCAxmgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBlTELMAkGA1UEBhMCR1Ix
|
||||
RDBCBgNVBAoTO0hlbGxlbmljIEFjYWRlbWljIGFuZCBSZXNlYXJjaCBJbnN0aXR1
|
||||
dGlvbnMgQ2VydC4gQXV0aG9yaXR5MUAwPgYDVQQDEzdIZWxsZW5pYyBBY2FkZW1p
|
||||
YyBhbmQgUmVzZWFyY2ggSW5zdGl0dXRpb25zIFJvb3RDQSAyMDExMB4XDTExMTIw
|
||||
NjEzNDk1MloXDTMxMTIwMTEzNDk1MlowgZUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdSMUQwQgYDVQQK
|
||||
EztIZWxsZW5pYyBBY2FkZW1pYyBhbmQgUmVzZWFyY2ggSW5zdGl0dXRpb25zIENl
|
||||
cnQuIEF1dGhvcml0eTFAMD4GA1UEAxM3SGVsbGVuaWMgQWNhZGVtaWMgYW5kIFJl
|
||||
c2VhcmNoIEluc3RpdHV0aW9ucyBSb290Q0EgMjAxMTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB
|
||||
BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKlTAOMupvaO+mDYLZU++CwqVE7NuYRhlFhPjz2L5EPz
|
||||
dYmNUeTDN9KKiE15HrcS3UN4SoqS5tdI1Q+kOilENbgH9mgdVc04UfCMJDGFr4PJ
|
||||
fel3r+0ae50X+bOdOFAPplp5kYCvN66m0zH7tSYJnTxa71HFK9+WXesyHgLacEns
|
||||
bgzImjeN9/E2YEsmLIKe0HjzDQ9jpFEw4fkrJxIH2Oq9GGKYsFk3fb7u8yBRQlqD
|
||||
75O6aRXxYp2fmTmCobd0LovUxQt7L/DICto9eQqakxylKHJzkUOap9FNhYS5qXSP
|
||||
FEDH3N6sQWRstBmbAmNtJGSPRLIl6s5ddAxjMlyNh+UCAwEAAaOBiTCBhjAPBgNV
|
||||
HRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUppFC/RNhSiOeCKQp
|
||||
5dgTBCPuQSUwRwYDVR0eBEAwPqA8MAWCAy5ncjAFggMuZXUwBoIELmVkdTAGggQu
|
||||
b3JnMAWBAy5ncjAFgQMuZXUwBoEELmVkdTAGgQQub3JnMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA
|
||||
A4IBAQAf73lB4XtuP7KMhjdCSk4cNx6NZrokgclPEg8hwAOXhiVtXdMiKahsog2p
|
||||
6z0GW5k6x8zDmjR/qw7IThzh+uTczQ2+vyT+bOdrwg3IBp5OjWEopmr95fZi6hg8
|
||||
TqBTnbI6nOulnJEWtk2C4AwFSKls9cz4y51JtPACpf1wA+2KIaWuE4ZJwzNzvoc7
|
||||
dIsXRSZMFpGD/md9zU1jZ/rzAxKWeAaNsWftjj++n08C9bMJL/NMh98qy5V8Acys
|
||||
Nnq/onN694/BtZqhFLKPM58N7yLcZnuEvUUXBj08yrl3NI/K6s8/MT7jiOOASSXI
|
||||
l7WdmplNsDz4SgCbZN2fOUvRJ9e4
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Hongkong Post
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -4338,57 +4497,6 @@ uLjbvrW5KfnaNwUASZQDhETnv0Mxz3WLJdH0pmT1kvarBes96aULNmLazAZfNou2
|
|||
XjG4Kvte9nHfRCaexOYNkbQudZWAUWpLMKawYqGT8ZvYzsRjdT9ZR7E=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Network Solutions L.L.C.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=US/O=Network Solutions L.L.C./CN=Network Solutions Certificate Authority
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
57:cb:33:6f:c2:5c:16:e6:47:16:17:e3:90:31:68:e0
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Dec 1 00:00:00 2006 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 2029 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=US, O=Network Solutions L.L.C., CN=Network Solutions Certificate Authority
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
21:30:C9:FB:00:D7:4E:98:DA:87:AA:2A:D0:A7:2E:B1:40:31:A7:4C
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
|
||||
|
||||
Full Name:
|
||||
URI:http://crl.netsolssl.com/NetworkSolutionsCertificateAuthority.crl
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=74:F8:A3:C3:EF:E7:B3:90:06:4B:83:90:3C:21:64:60:20:E5:DF:CE
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=15:F0:BA:00:A3:AC:7A:F3:AC:88:4C:07:2B:10:11:A0:77:BD:77:C0:97:F4:01:64:B2:F8:59:8A:BD:83:86:0C
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIID5jCCAs6gAwIBAgIQV8szb8JcFuZHFhfjkDFo4DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBi
|
||||
MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEhMB8GA1UEChMYTmV0d29yayBTb2x1dGlvbnMgTC5MLkMu
|
||||
MTAwLgYDVQQDEydOZXR3b3JrIFNvbHV0aW9ucyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3Jp
|
||||
dHkwHhcNMDYxMjAxMDAwMDAwWhcNMjkxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjBiMQswCQYDVQQGEwJV
|
||||
UzEhMB8GA1UEChMYTmV0d29yayBTb2x1dGlvbnMgTC5MLkMuMTAwLgYDVQQDEydO
|
||||
ZXR3b3JrIFNvbHV0aW9ucyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkwggEiMA0GCSqG
|
||||
SIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDkvH6SMG3G2I4rC7xGzuAnlt7e+foS0zwz
|
||||
c7MEL7xxjOWftiJgPl9dzgn/ggwbmlFQGiaJ3dVhXRncEg8tCqJDXRfQNJIg6nPP
|
||||
OCwGJgl6cvf6UDL4wpPTaaIjzkGxzOTVHzbRijr4jGPiFFlp7Q3Tf2vouAPlT2rl
|
||||
mGNpSAW+Lv8ztumXWWn4Zxmuk2GWRBXTcrA/vGp97Eh/jcOrqnErU2lBUzS1sLnF
|
||||
BgrEsEX1QV1uiUV7PTsmjHTC5dLRfbIR1PtYMiKagMnc/Qzpf14Dl847ABSHJ3A4
|
||||
qY5usyd2mFHgBeMhqxrVhSI8KbWaFsWAqPS7azCPL0YCorEMIuDTAgMBAAGjgZcw
|
||||
gZQwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCEwyfsA106Y2oeqKtCnLrFAMadMMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIB
|
||||
BjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MFIGA1UdHwRLMEkwR6BFoEOGQWh0dHA6Ly9jcmwu
|
||||
bmV0c29sc3NsLmNvbS9OZXR3b3JrU29sdXRpb25zQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVBdXRob3Jp
|
||||
dHkuY3JsMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQC7rkvnt1frf6ott3NHhWrB5KUd5Oc8
|
||||
6fRZZXe1eltajSU24HqXLjjAV2CDmAaDn7l2em5Q4LqILPxFzBiwmZVRDuwduIj/
|
||||
h1AcgsLj4DKAv6ALR8jDMe+ZZzKATxcheQxpXN5eNK4CtSbqUN9/GGUsyfJj4akH
|
||||
/nxxH2szJGoeBfcFaMBqEssuXmHLrijTfsK0ZpEmXzwuJF/LWA/rKOyvEZbz3Htv
|
||||
wKeI8lN3s2Berq4o2jUsbzRF0ybh3uxbTydrFny9RAQYgrOJeRcQcT16ohZO9QHN
|
||||
pGxlaKFJdlxDydi8NmdspZS11My5vWo1ViHe2MPr+8ukYEywVaCge1ey
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### QuoVadis Limited
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=BM/O=QuoVadis Limited/CN=QuoVadis Root CA 1 G3
|
||||
|
|
@ -4672,6 +4780,92 @@ ywaZWWDYWGWVjUTR939+J399roD1B0y2PpxxVJkES/1Y+Zj0
|
|||
|
||||
### SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=JP/O=SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD./CN=Security Communication ECC RootCA1
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
d6:5d:9b:b3:78:81:2e:eb
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Jun 16 05:15:28 2016 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Jan 18 05:15:28 2038 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=JP, O=SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD., CN=Security Communication ECC RootCA1
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
86:1C:E7:FE:2D:A5:4A:8B:08:FE:28:11:FA:BE:A3:66:F8:60:59:2F
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=B8:0E:26:A9:BF:D2:B2:3B:C0:EF:46:C9:BA:C7:BB:F6:1D:0D:41:41
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=E7:4F:BD:A5:5B:D5:64:C4:73:A3:6B:44:1A:A7:99:C8:A6:8E:07:74:40:E8:28:8B:9F:A1:E5:0E:4B:BA:CA:11
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIICODCCAb6gAwIBAgIJANZdm7N4gS7rMAoGCCqGSM49BAMDMGExCzAJBgNVBAYT
|
||||
AkpQMSUwIwYDVQQKExxTRUNPTSBUcnVzdCBTeXN0ZW1zIENPLixMVEQuMSswKQYD
|
||||
VQQDEyJTZWN1cml0eSBDb21tdW5pY2F0aW9uIEVDQyBSb290Q0ExMB4XDTE2MDYx
|
||||
NjA1MTUyOFoXDTM4MDExODA1MTUyOFowYTELMAkGA1UEBhMCSlAxJTAjBgNVBAoT
|
||||
HFNFQ09NIFRydXN0IFN5c3RlbXMgQ08uLExURC4xKzApBgNVBAMTIlNlY3VyaXR5
|
||||
IENvbW11bmljYXRpb24gRUNDIFJvb3RDQTEwdjAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAIgNi
|
||||
AASkpW9gAwPDvTH00xecK4R1rOX9PVdu12O/5gSJko6BnOPpR27KkBLIE+Cnnfdl
|
||||
dB9sELLo5OnvbYUymUSxXv3MdhDYW72ixvnWQuRXdtyQwjWpS4g8EkdtXP9JTxpK
|
||||
ULGjQjBAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSGHOf+LaVKiwj+KBH6vqNm+GBZLzAOBgNVHQ8BAf8E
|
||||
BAMCAQYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAwNoADBlAjAVXUI9/Lbu
|
||||
9zuxNuie9sRGKEkz0FhDKmMpzE2xtHqiuQ04pV1IKv3LsnNdo4gIxwwCMQDAqy0O
|
||||
be0YottT6SXbVQjgUMzfRGEWgqtJsLKB7HOHeLRMsmIbEvoWTSVLY70eN9k=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=JP/O=SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD./CN=Security Communication RootCA3
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
e1:7c:37:40:fd:1b:fe:67
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Jun 16 06:17:16 2016 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Jan 18 06:17:16 2038 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=JP, O=SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD., CN=Security Communication RootCA3
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
64:14:7C:FC:58:72:16:A6:0A:29:34:15:6F:2A:CB:BC:FC:AF:A8:AB
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=C3:03:C8:22:74:92:E5:61:A2:9C:5F:79:91:2B:1E:44:13:91:30:3A
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=24:A5:5C:2A:B0:51:44:2D:06:17:76:65:41:23:9A:4A:D0:32:D7:C5:51:75:AA:34:FF:DE:2F:BC:4F:5C:52:94
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIFfzCCA2egAwIBAgIJAOF8N0D9G/5nMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDAUAMF0xCzAJBgNV
|
||||
BAYTAkpQMSUwIwYDVQQKExxTRUNPTSBUcnVzdCBTeXN0ZW1zIENPLixMVEQuMScw
|
||||
JQYDVQQDEx5TZWN1cml0eSBDb21tdW5pY2F0aW9uIFJvb3RDQTMwHhcNMTYwNjE2
|
||||
MDYxNzE2WhcNMzgwMTE4MDYxNzE2WjBdMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDElMCMGA1UEChMc
|
||||
U0VDT00gVHJ1c3QgU3lzdGVtcyBDTy4sTFRELjEnMCUGA1UEAxMeU2VjdXJpdHkg
|
||||
Q29tbXVuaWNhdGlvbiBSb290Q0EzMIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIIC
|
||||
CgKCAgEA48lySfcw3gl8qUCBWNO0Ot26YQ+TUG5pPDXC7ltzkBtnTCHsXzW7OT4r
|
||||
CmDvu20rhvtxosis5FaU+cmvsXLUIKx00rgVrVH+hXShuRD+BYD5UpOzQD11EKzA
|
||||
lrenfna84xtSGc4RHwsENPXY9Wk8d/Nk9A2qhd7gCVAEF5aEt8iKvE1y/By7z/MG
|
||||
TfmfZPd+pmaGNXHIEYBMwXFAWB6+oHP2/D5Q4eAvJj1+XCO1eXDe+uDRpdYMQXF7
|
||||
9+qMHIjH7Iv10S9VlkZ8WjtYO/u62C21Jdp6Ts9EriGmnpjKIG58u4iFW/vAEGK7
|
||||
8vknR+/RiTlDxN/e4UG/VHMgly1s2vPUB6PmudhvrvyMGS7TZ2crldtYXLVqAvO4
|
||||
g160a75BflcJdURQVc1aEWEhCmHCqYj9E7wtiS/NYeCVvsq1e+F7NGcLH7YMx3we
|
||||
GVPKp7FKFSBWFHA9K4IsD50VHUeAR/94mQ4xr28+j+2GaR57GIgUssL8gjMunEst
|
||||
+3A7caoreyYn8xrC3PsXuKHqy6C0rtOUfnrQq8PsOC0RLoi/1D+tEjtCrI8Cbn3M
|
||||
0V9hvqG8OmpI6iZVIhZdXw3/JzOfGAN0iltSIEdrRU0id4xVJ/CvHozJgyJUt5rQ
|
||||
T9nO/NkuHJYosQLTA70lUhw0Zk8jq/R3gpYd0VcwCBEF/VfR2ccCAwEAAaNCMEAw
|
||||
HQYDVR0OBBYEFGQUfPxYchamCik0FW8qy7z8r6irMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAP
|
||||
BgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDAUAA4ICAQDcAiMI4u8hOscNtybS
|
||||
YpOnpSNyByCCYN8Y11StaSWSntkUz5m5UoHPrmyKO1o5yGwBQ8IibQLwYs1OY0PA
|
||||
FNr0Y/Dq9HHuTofjcan0yVflLl8cebsjqodEV+m9NU1Bu0soo5iyG9kLFwfl9+qd
|
||||
9XbXv8S2gVj/yP9kaWJ5rW4OH3/uHWnlt3Jxs/6lATWUVCvAUm2PVcTJ0rjLyjQI
|
||||
UYWg9by0F1jqClx6vWPGOi//lkkZhOpn2ASxYfQAW0q3nHE3GYV5v4GwxxMOdnE+
|
||||
OoAGrgYWp421wsTL/0ClXI2lyTrtcoHKXJg80jQDdwj98ClZXSEIx2C/pHF7uNke
|
||||
gr4Jr2VvKKu/S7XuPghHJ6APbw+LP6yVGPO5DtxnVW5inkYO0QR4ynKudtml+LLf
|
||||
iAlhi+8kTtFZP1rUPcmTPCtk9YENFpb3ksP+MW/oKjJ0DvRMmEoYDjBU1cXrvMUV
|
||||
nuiZIesnKwkK2/HmcBhWuwzkvvnoEKQTkrgc4NtnHVMDpCKn3F2SEDzq//wbEBrD
|
||||
2NCcnWXL0CsnMQMeNuE9dnUM/0Umud1RvCPHX9jYhxBAEg09ODfnRDwYwFMJZI//
|
||||
1ZqmfHAuc1Uh6N//g7kdPjIe1qZ9LPFm6Vwdp6POXiUyK+OVrCoHzrQoeIY8Laad
|
||||
TdJ0MN1kURXbg4NR16/9M51NZg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=JP/O=SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD./OU=Security Communication RootCA2
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
|
|
@ -5051,60 +5245,6 @@ oYYitmUnDuy2n0Jg5GfCtdpBC8TTi2EbvPofkSvXRAdeuims2cXp71NIWuuA8ShY
|
|||
Ic2wBlX7Jz9TkHCpBB5XJ7k=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Staat der Nederlanden
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=NL/O=Staat der Nederlanden/CN=Staat der Nederlanden EV Root CA
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number: 10000013 (0x98968d)
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Dec 8 11:19:29 2010 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 8 11:10:28 2022 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=NL, O=Staat der Nederlanden, CN=Staat der Nederlanden EV Root CA
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
FE:AB:00:90:98:9E:24:FC:A9:CC:1A:8A:FB:27:B8:BF:30:6E:A8:3B
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=76:E2:7E:C1:4F:DB:82:C1:C0:A6:75:B5:05:BE:3D:29:B4:ED:DB:BB
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=4D:24:91:41:4C:FE:95:67:46:EC:4C:EF:A6:CF:6F:72:E2:8A:13:29:43:2F:9D:8A:90:7A:C4:CB:5D:AD:C1:5A
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIFcDCCA1igAwIBAgIEAJiWjTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBYMQswCQYDVQQGEwJO
|
||||
TDEeMBwGA1UECgwVU3RhYXQgZGVyIE5lZGVybGFuZGVuMSkwJwYDVQQDDCBTdGFh
|
||||
dCBkZXIgTmVkZXJsYW5kZW4gRVYgUm9vdCBDQTAeFw0xMDEyMDgxMTE5MjlaFw0y
|
||||
MjEyMDgxMTEwMjhaMFgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMR4wHAYDVQQKDBVTdGFhdCBkZXIg
|
||||
TmVkZXJsYW5kZW4xKTAnBgNVBAMMIFN0YWF0IGRlciBOZWRlcmxhbmRlbiBFViBS
|
||||
b290IENBMIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA48d+ifkkSzrS
|
||||
M4M1LGns3Amk41GoJSt5uAg94JG6hIXGhaTK5skuU6TJJB79VWZxXSzFYGgEt9nC
|
||||
UiY4iKTWO0Cmws0/zZiTs1QUWJZV1VD+hq2kY39ch/aO5ieSZxeSAgMs3NZmdO3d
|
||||
Z//BYY1jTw+bbRcwJu+r0h8QoPnFfxZpgQNH7R5ojXKhTbImxrpsX23Wr9GxE46p
|
||||
rfNeaXUmGD5BKyF/7otdBwadQ8QpCiv8Kj6GyzyDOvnJDdrFmeK8eEEzduG/L13l
|
||||
pJhQDBXd4Pqcfzho0LKmeqfRMb1+ilgnQ7O6M5HTp5gVXJrm0w912fxBmJc+qiXb
|
||||
j5IusHsMX/FjqTf5m3VpTCgmJdrV8hJwRVXj33NeN/UhbJCONVrJ0yPr08C+eKxC
|
||||
KFhmpUZtcALXEPlLVPxdhkqHz3/KRawRWrUgUY0viEeXOcDPusBCAUCZSCELa6fS
|
||||
/ZbV0b5GnUngC6agIk440ME8MLxwjyx1zNDFjFE7PZQIZCZhfbnDZY8UnCHQqv0X
|
||||
cgOPvZuM5l5Tnrmd74K74bzickFbIZTTRTeU0d8JOV3nI6qaHcptqAqGhYqCvkIH
|
||||
1vI4gnPah1vlPNOePqc7nvQDs/nxfRN0Av+7oeX6AHkcpmZBiFxgV6YuCcS6/ZrP
|
||||
px9Aw7vMWgpVSzs4dlG4Y4uElBbmVvMCAwEAAaNCMEAwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB
|
||||
/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFP6rAJCYniT8qcwaivsnuL8wbqg7
|
||||
MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4ICAQDPdyxuVr5Os7aEAJSrR8kN0nbHhp8dB9O2tLsI
|
||||
eK9p0gtJ3jPFrK3CiAJ9Brc1AsFgyb/E6JTe1NOpEyVa/m6irn0F3H3zbPB+po3u
|
||||
2dfOWBfoqSmuc0iH55vKbimhZF8ZE/euBhD/UcabTVUlT5OZEAFTdfETzsemQUHS
|
||||
v4ilf0X8rLiltTMMgsT7B/Zq5SWEXwbKwYY5EdtYzXc7LMJMD16a4/CrPmEbUCTC
|
||||
wPTxGfARKbalGAKb12NMcIxHowNDXLldRqANb/9Zjr7dn3LDWyvfjFvO5QxGbJKy
|
||||
CqNMVEIYFRIYvdr8unRu/8G2oGTYqV9Vrp9canaW2HNnh/tNf1zuacpzEPuKqf2e
|
||||
vTY4SUmH9A4U8OmHuD+nT3pajnnUk+S7aFKErGzp85hwVXIy+TSrK0m1zSBi5Dp6
|
||||
Z2Orltxtrpfs/J92VoguZs9btsmksNcFuuEnL5O7Jiqik7Ab846+HUCjuTaPPoIa
|
||||
Gl6I6lD4WeKDRikL40Rc4ZW2aZCaFG+XroHPaO+Zmr615+F/+PoTRxZMzG0IQOeL
|
||||
eG9QgkRQP2YGiqtDhFZKDyAthg710tvSeopLzaXoTvFeJiUBWSOgftL2fiFX1ye8
|
||||
FVdMpEbB4IMeDExNH08GGeL5qPQ6gqGyeUN51q1veieQA6TqJIc/2b3Z6fJfUEkc
|
||||
7uzXLg==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Starfield Technologies, Inc.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=US/O=Starfield Technologies, Inc./OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
|
||||
|
|
@ -5792,163 +5932,6 @@ L6KCq9NjRHDEjf8tM7qtj3u1cIiuPhnPQCjY/MiQu12ZIvVS5ljFH4gxQ+6IHdfG
|
|||
jjxDah2nGN59PRbxYvnKkKj9
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### TrustCor Systems S. de R.L.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=PA/ST=Panama/L=Panama City/O=TrustCor Systems S. de R.L./OU=TrustCor Certificate Authority/CN=TrustCor ECA-1
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
84:82:2c:5f:1c:62:d0:40
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Feb 4 12:32:33 2016 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 31 17:28:07 2029 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=PA, ST=Panama, L=Panama City, O=TrustCor Systems S. de R.L., OU=TrustCor Certificate Authority, CN=TrustCor ECA-1
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
44:9E:48:F5:CC:6D:48:D4:A0:4B:7F:FE:59:24:2F:83:97:99:9A:86
|
||||
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
|
||||
keyid:44:9E:48:F5:CC:6D:48:D4:A0:4B:7F:FE:59:24:2F:83:97:99:9A:86
|
||||
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=58:D1:DF:95:95:67:6B:63:C0:F0:5B:1C:17:4D:8B:84:0B:C8:78:BD
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=5A:88:5D:B1:9C:01:D9:12:C5:75:93:88:93:8C:AF:BB:DF:03:1A:B2:D4:8E:91:EE:15:58:9B:42:97:1D:03:9C
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIEIDCCAwigAwIBAgIJAISCLF8cYtBAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMIGcMQswCQYD
|
||||
VQQGEwJQQTEPMA0GA1UECAwGUGFuYW1hMRQwEgYDVQQHDAtQYW5hbWEgQ2l0eTEk
|
||||
MCIGA1UECgwbVHJ1c3RDb3IgU3lzdGVtcyBTLiBkZSBSLkwuMScwJQYDVQQLDB5U
|
||||
cnVzdENvciBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDlRydXN0Q29y
|
||||
IEVDQS0xMB4XDTE2MDIwNDEyMzIzM1oXDTI5MTIzMTE3MjgwN1owgZwxCzAJBgNV
|
||||
BAYTAlBBMQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZQYW5hbWExFDASBgNVBAcMC1BhbmFtYSBDaXR5MSQw
|
||||
IgYDVQQKDBtUcnVzdENvciBTeXN0ZW1zIFMuIGRlIFIuTC4xJzAlBgNVBAsMHlRy
|
||||
dXN0Q29yIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOVHJ1c3RDb3Ig
|
||||
RUNBLTEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDPj+ARtZ+odnbb
|
||||
3w9U73NjKYKtR8aja+3+XzP4Q1HpGjORMRegdMTUpwHmspI+ap3tDvl0mEDTPwOA
|
||||
BoJA6LHip1GnHYMma6ve+heRK9jGrB6xnhkB1Zem6g23xFUfJ3zSCNV2HykVh0A5
|
||||
3ThFEXXQmqc04L/NyFIduUd+Dbi7xgz2c1cWWn5DkR9VOsZtRASqnKmcp0yJF4Ou
|
||||
owReUoCLHhIlERnXDH19MURB6tuvsBzvgdAsxZohmz3tQjtQJvLsznFhBmIhVE5/
|
||||
wZ0+fyCMgMsq2JdiyIMzkX2woloPV+g7zPIlstR8L+xNxqE6FXrntl019fZISjZF
|
||||
ZtS6mFjBAgMBAAGjYzBhMB0GA1UdDgQWBBREnkj1zG1I1KBLf/5ZJC+Dl5mahjAf
|
||||
BgNVHSMEGDAWgBREnkj1zG1I1KBLf/5ZJC+Dl5mahjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/
|
||||
MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBhjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABT41XBVwm8nHc2Fv
|
||||
civUwo/yQ10CzsSUuZQRg2dd4mdsdXa/uwyqNsatR5Nj3B5+1t4u/ukZMjgDfxT2
|
||||
AHMsWbEhBuH7rBiVDKP/mZb3Kyeb1STMHd3BOuCYRLDE5D53sXOpZCz2HAF8P11F
|
||||
hcCF5yWPldwX8zyfGm6wyuMdKulMY/okYWLW2n62HGz1Ah3UKt1VkOsqEUc8Ll50
|
||||
soIipX1TH0XsJ5F95yIW6MBoNtjG8U+ARDL54dHRHareqKucBK+tIA5kmE2la8BI
|
||||
WJZpTdwHjFGTot+fDz2LYLSCjaoITmJF4PkL0uDgPFveXHEnJcLmA4GLEFPjx1Wi
|
||||
tJ/X5g==
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=PA/ST=Panama/L=Panama City/O=TrustCor Systems S. de R.L./OU=TrustCor Certificate Authority/CN=TrustCor RootCert CA-1
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number:
|
||||
da:9b:ec:71:f3:03:b0:19
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Feb 4 12:32:16 2016 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 31 17:23:16 2029 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=PA, ST=Panama, L=Panama City, O=TrustCor Systems S. de R.L., OU=TrustCor Certificate Authority, CN=TrustCor RootCert CA-1
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
EE:6B:49:3C:7A:3F:0D:E3:B1:09:B7:8A:C8:AB:19:9F:73:33:50:E7
|
||||
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
|
||||
keyid:EE:6B:49:3C:7A:3F:0D:E3:B1:09:B7:8A:C8:AB:19:9F:73:33:50:E7
|
||||
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=FF:BD:CD:E7:82:C8:43:5E:3C:6F:26:86:5C:CA:A8:3A:45:5B:C3:0A
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=D4:0E:9C:86:CD:8F:E4:68:C1:77:69:59:F4:9E:A7:74:FA:54:86:84:B6:C4:06:F3:90:92:61:F4:DC:E2:57:5C
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIEMDCCAxigAwIBAgIJANqb7HHzA7AZMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMIGkMQswCQYD
|
||||
VQQGEwJQQTEPMA0GA1UECAwGUGFuYW1hMRQwEgYDVQQHDAtQYW5hbWEgQ2l0eTEk
|
||||
MCIGA1UECgwbVHJ1c3RDb3IgU3lzdGVtcyBTLiBkZSBSLkwuMScwJQYDVQQLDB5U
|
||||
cnVzdENvciBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkxHzAdBgNVBAMMFlRydXN0Q29y
|
||||
IFJvb3RDZXJ0IENBLTEwHhcNMTYwMjA0MTIzMjE2WhcNMjkxMjMxMTcyMzE2WjCB
|
||||
pDELMAkGA1UEBhMCUEExDzANBgNVBAgMBlBhbmFtYTEUMBIGA1UEBwwLUGFuYW1h
|
||||
IENpdHkxJDAiBgNVBAoMG1RydXN0Q29yIFN5c3RlbXMgUy4gZGUgUi5MLjEnMCUG
|
||||
A1UECwweVHJ1c3RDb3IgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5MR8wHQYDVQQDDBZU
|
||||
cnVzdENvciBSb290Q2VydCBDQS0xMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIB
|
||||
CgKCAQEAv463leLCJhJrMxnHQFgKq1mqjQCj/IDHUHuO1CAmujIS2CNUSSUQIpid
|
||||
RtLByZ5OGy4sDjjzGiVoHKZaBeYei0i/mJZ0PmnK6bV4pQa81QBeCQryJ3pS/C3V
|
||||
seq0iWEk8xoT26nPUu0MJLq5nux+AHT6k61sKZKuUbS701e/s/OojZz0JEsq1pme
|
||||
9J7+wH5COucLlVPat2gOkEz7cD+PSiyU8ybdY2mplNgQTsVHCJCZGxdNuWxu72CV
|
||||
EY4hgLW9oHPY0LJ3xEXqWib7ZnZ2+AYfYW0PVcWDtxBWcgYHpfOxGgMFZA6dWorW
|
||||
hnAbJN7+KIor0Gqw/Hqi3LJ5DotlDwIDAQABo2MwYTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU7mtJPHo/
|
||||
DeOxCbeKyKsZn3MzUOcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU7mtJPHo/DeOxCbeKyKsZn3MzUOcw
|
||||
DwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAYYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD
|
||||
ggEBACUY1JGPE+6PHh0RU9otRCkZoB5rMZ5NDp6tPVxBb5UrJKF5mDo4Nvu7Zp5I
|
||||
/5CQ7z3UuJu0h3U/IJvOcs+hVcFNZKIZBqEHMwwLKeXx6quj7LUKdJDHfXLy11yf
|
||||
ke+Ri7fc7Waiz45mO7yfOgLgJ90WmMCV1Aqk5IGadZQ1nJBfiDcGrVmVCrDRZ9MZ
|
||||
yonnMlo2HD6CqFqTvsbQZJG2z9m2GM/bftJlo6bEjhcxwft+dtvTheNYsnd6djts
|
||||
L1Ac59v2Z3kf9YKVmgenFK+P3CghZwnS1k1aHBkcjndcw5QkPTJrS37UeJSDvjdN
|
||||
zl/HHk484IkzlQsPpTLWPFp5LBk=
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
=== /C=PA/ST=Panama/L=Panama City/O=TrustCor Systems S. de R.L./OU=TrustCor Certificate Authority/CN=TrustCor RootCert CA-2
|
||||
Certificate:
|
||||
Data:
|
||||
Version: 3 (0x2)
|
||||
Serial Number: 2711694510199101698 (0x25a1dfca33cb5902)
|
||||
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
|
||||
Validity
|
||||
Not Before: Feb 4 12:32:23 2016 GMT
|
||||
Not After : Dec 31 17:26:39 2034 GMT
|
||||
Subject: C=PA, ST=Panama, L=Panama City, O=TrustCor Systems S. de R.L., OU=TrustCor Certificate Authority, CN=TrustCor RootCert CA-2
|
||||
X509v3 extensions:
|
||||
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
|
||||
D9:FE:21:40:6E:94:9E:BC:9B:3D:9C:7D:98:20:19:E5:8C:30:62:B2
|
||||
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
|
||||
keyid:D9:FE:21:40:6E:94:9E:BC:9B:3D:9C:7D:98:20:19:E5:8C:30:62:B2
|
||||
|
||||
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
|
||||
CA:TRUE
|
||||
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
|
||||
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
|
||||
SHA1 Fingerprint=B8:BE:6D:CB:56:F1:55:B9:63:D4:12:CA:4E:06:34:C7:94:B2:1C:C0
|
||||
SHA256 Fingerprint=07:53:E9:40:37:8C:1B:D5:E3:83:6E:39:5D:AE:A5:CB:83:9E:50:46:F1:BD:0E:AE:19:51:CF:10:FE:C7:C9:65
|
||||
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
MIIGLzCCBBegAwIBAgIIJaHfyjPLWQIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwgaQxCzAJBgNV
|
||||
BAYTAlBBMQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZQYW5hbWExFDASBgNVBAcMC1BhbmFtYSBDaXR5MSQw
|
||||
IgYDVQQKDBtUcnVzdENvciBTeXN0ZW1zIFMuIGRlIFIuTC4xJzAlBgNVBAsMHlRy
|
||||
dXN0Q29yIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTEfMB0GA1UEAwwWVHJ1c3RDb3Ig
|
||||
Um9vdENlcnQgQ0EtMjAeFw0xNjAyMDQxMjMyMjNaFw0zNDEyMzExNzI2MzlaMIGk
|
||||
MQswCQYDVQQGEwJQQTEPMA0GA1UECAwGUGFuYW1hMRQwEgYDVQQHDAtQYW5hbWEg
|
||||
Q2l0eTEkMCIGA1UECgwbVHJ1c3RDb3IgU3lzdGVtcyBTLiBkZSBSLkwuMScwJQYD
|
||||
VQQLDB5UcnVzdENvciBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkxHzAdBgNVBAMMFlRy
|
||||
dXN0Q29yIFJvb3RDZXJ0IENBLTIwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAwggIK
|
||||
AoICAQCnIG7CKqJiJJWQdsg4foDSq8GbZQWU9MEKENUCrO2fk8eHyLAnK0IMPQo+
|
||||
QVqedd2NyuCb7GgypGmSaIwLgQ5WoD4a3SwlFIIvl9NkRvRUqdw6VC0xK5mC8tkq
|
||||
1+9xALgxpL56JAfDQiDyitSSBBtlVkxs1Pu2YVpHI7TYabS3OtB0PAx1oYxOdqHp
|
||||
2yqlO/rOsP9+aij9JxzIsekp8VduZLTQwRVtDr4uDkbIXvRR/u8OYzo7cbrPb1nK
|
||||
DOObXUm4TOJXsZiKQlecdu/vvdFoqNL0Cbt3Nb4lggjEFixEIFapRBF37120Hape
|
||||
az6LMvYHL1cEksr1/p3C6eizjkxLAjHZ5DxIgif3GIJ2SDpxsROhOdUuxTTCHWKF
|
||||
3wP+TfSvPd9cW436cOGlfifHhi5qjxLGhF5DUVCcGZt45vz27Ud+ez1m7xMTiF88
|
||||
oWP7+ayHNZ/zgp6kPwqcMWmLmaSISo5uZk3vFsQPeSghYA2FFn3XVDjxklb9tTNM
|
||||
g9zXEJ9L/cb4Qr26fHMC4P99zVvh1Kxhe1fVSntb1IVYJ12/+CtgrKAmrhQhJ8Z3
|
||||
mjOAPF5GP/fDsaOGM8boXg25NSyqRsGFAnWAoOsk+xWq5Gd/bnc/9ASKL3x74xdh
|
||||
8N0JqSDIvgmk0H5Ew7IwSjiqqewYmgeCK9u4nBit2uBGF6zPXQIDAQABo2MwYTAd
|
||||
BgNVHQ4EFgQU2f4hQG6UnrybPZx9mCAZ5YwwYrIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU2f4hQG6U
|
||||
nrybPZx9mCAZ5YwwYrIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAYYw
|
||||
DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggIBAJ5Fngw7tu/hOsh80QA9z+LqBrWyOrsGS2h60COX
|
||||
dKcs8AjYeVrXWoSK2BKaG9l9XE1wxaX5q+WjiYndAfrs3fnpkpfbsEZC89NiqpX+
|
||||
MWcUaViQCqoL7jcjx1BRtPV+nuN79+TMQjItSQzL/0kMmx40/W5ulop5A7Zv2wnL
|
||||
/V9lFDfhOPXzYRZY5LVtDQsEGz9QLX+zx3oaFoBg+Iof6Rsqxvm6ARppv9JYx1RX
|
||||
CI/hOWB3S6xZhBqI8d3LT3jX5+EzLfzuQfogsL7L9ziUwOHQhQ+77Sxzq+3+knYa
|
||||
ZH9bDTMJBzN7Bj8RpFxwPIXAz+OQqIN3+tvmxYxoZxBnpVIt8MSZj3+/0WvitUfW
|
||||
2dCFmU2Umw9Lje4AWkcdEQOsQRivh7dvDDqPys/cA8GiCcjl/YBeyGBCARsaU1q7
|
||||
N6a3vLqE6R5sGtRk2tRD/pOLS/IseRYQ1JMLiI+h2IYURpFHmygk71dSTlxCnKr3
|
||||
Sewn6EAes6aJInKc9Q0ztFijMDvd1GpUk74aTfOTlPf8hAs/hCBcNANExdqtvArB
|
||||
As8e5ZTZ845b2EzwnexhF7sUMlQMAimTHpKG9n/v55IFDlndmQguLvqcAFLTxWYp
|
||||
5KeXRKQOKIETNcX2b2TmQcTVL8w0RSXPQQCWPUouwpaYT05KnJe32x+SMsj/D1Fu
|
||||
1uwJ
|
||||
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
||||
|
||||
### Trustwave Holdings, Inc.
|
||||
|
||||
=== /C=US/ST=Illinois/L=Chicago/O=Trustwave Holdings, Inc./CN=Trustwave Global Certification Authority
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: crypto_init.c,v 1.8 2023/05/08 13:53:26 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2018 Bob Beck <beck@openbsd.org>
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: ec_asn1.c,v 1.42 2023/04/25 19:53:30 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: ec_asn1.c,v 1.45 2023/05/04 05:59:38 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -225,7 +225,6 @@ static const ASN1_ADB_TABLE X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_adbtbl[] = {
|
|||
.field_name = "p.onBasis",
|
||||
.item = &ASN1_NULL_it,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
.value = NID_X9_62_tpBasis,
|
||||
|
|
@ -236,7 +235,6 @@ static const ASN1_ADB_TABLE X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_adbtbl[] = {
|
|||
.field_name = "p.tpBasis",
|
||||
.item = &ASN1_INTEGER_it,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
.value = NID_X9_62_ppBasis,
|
||||
|
|
@ -327,7 +325,6 @@ static const ASN1_ADB_TABLE X9_62_FIELDID_adbtbl[] = {
|
|||
.field_name = "p.prime",
|
||||
.item = &ASN1_INTEGER_it,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
.value = NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field,
|
||||
|
|
@ -338,7 +335,6 @@ static const ASN1_ADB_TABLE X9_62_FIELDID_adbtbl[] = {
|
|||
.field_name = "p.char_two",
|
||||
.item = &X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_it,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -619,7 +615,7 @@ EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(EC_PRIVATEKEY *a)
|
|||
|
||||
/* some declarations of internal function */
|
||||
|
||||
/* ec_asn1_group2field() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */
|
||||
/* ec_asn1_group2fieldid() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */
|
||||
static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_FIELDID *);
|
||||
/* ec_asn1_group2curve() sets the values in a X9_62_CURVE object */
|
||||
static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_CURVE *);
|
||||
|
|
@ -912,8 +908,8 @@ ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
|
|||
} else {
|
||||
/* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */
|
||||
ret->type = 1;
|
||||
if ((ret->value.parameters = ec_asn1_group2parameters(
|
||||
group, NULL)) == NULL)
|
||||
if ((ret->value.parameters = ec_asn1_group2parameters(group,
|
||||
NULL)) == NULL)
|
||||
ok = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1098,7 +1094,7 @@ ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
|
|||
/* EC_GROUP <-> DER encoding of ECPKPARAMETERS */
|
||||
|
||||
EC_GROUP *
|
||||
d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP ** a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
|
||||
ECPKPARAMETERS *params;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1143,7 +1139,7 @@ i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out)
|
|||
/* some EC_KEY functions */
|
||||
|
||||
EC_KEY *
|
||||
d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY ** a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
|
||||
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1329,7 +1325,7 @@ i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EC_KEY *
|
||||
d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY ** a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EC_KEY *ret;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1358,7 +1354,7 @@ d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY ** a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EC_KEY *
|
||||
o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY ** a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: ec_lib.c,v 1.56 2023/04/25 19:53:30 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: ec_lib.c,v 1.57 2023/05/04 13:51:59 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -1459,15 +1459,20 @@ ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group)
|
|||
EC_KEY *
|
||||
ECParameters_dup(EC_KEY *key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *p = NULL;
|
||||
EC_KEY *k = NULL;
|
||||
const unsigned char *p;
|
||||
unsigned char *der = NULL;
|
||||
EC_KEY *dup = NULL;
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
|
||||
if (key == NULL)
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((len = i2d_ECParameters(key, &p)) > 0)
|
||||
k = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, len);
|
||||
if ((len = i2d_ECParameters(key, &der)) <= 0)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
return (k);
|
||||
p = der;
|
||||
dup = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &p, len);
|
||||
freezero(der, len);
|
||||
|
||||
return dup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: ec_oct.c,v 1.13 2023/05/01 21:15:26 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: ec_oct.c,v 1.14 2023/05/04 06:45:51 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
|
|||
BN_CTX *ctx_in)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BN_CTX *ctx;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
size_t ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = ctx_in) == NULL)
|
||||
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
.\" $OpenBSD: BN_generate_prime.3,v 1.22 2023/04/30 20:17:59 tb Exp $
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: BN_generate_prime.3,v 1.24 2023/05/12 08:18:13 jsg Exp $
|
||||
.\" full merge up to: OpenSSL f987a4dd Jun 27 10:12:08 2019 +0200
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.\" This file is a derived work.
|
||||
|
|
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
|
|||
.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
||||
.\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 30 2023 $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 12 2023 $
|
||||
.Dt BN_GENERATE_PRIME 3
|
||||
.Os
|
||||
.Sh NAME
|
||||
|
|
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
|
|||
.Nm BN_GENCB_get_arg ,
|
||||
.Nm BN_GENCB_set_old
|
||||
.\" Nm BN_prime_checks_for_size is intentionally undocumented
|
||||
.\" because it is no longer used by LibreSSL.
|
||||
.\" because it should not be used outside of libcrypto.
|
||||
.Nd generate primes and test for primality
|
||||
.Sh SYNOPSIS
|
||||
.In openssl/bn.h
|
||||
|
|
@ -147,13 +147,14 @@ and
|
|||
test whether the number
|
||||
.Fa a
|
||||
is prime.
|
||||
In LibreSSL, both functions behave identically,
|
||||
use the Baillie-Pomerance-Selfridge-Wagstaff algorithm,
|
||||
and ignore the
|
||||
In LibreSSL, both functions behave identically
|
||||
and use the Baillie-Pomerance-Selfridge-Wagstaff algorithm
|
||||
combined with
|
||||
.Fa checks
|
||||
and
|
||||
Miller-Rabin rounds.
|
||||
The
|
||||
.Fa do_trial_division
|
||||
arguments.
|
||||
argument is ignored.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
It is unknown whether any composite number exists that the
|
||||
Baillie-PSW algorithm misclassifies as a prime.
|
||||
|
|
@ -161,6 +162,20 @@ Some suspect that there may be infinitely many such numbers,
|
|||
but not a single one is currently known.
|
||||
It is known that no such number exists below 2\(ha64.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
In order to reduce the likelihood of a composite number
|
||||
passing the primality tests
|
||||
.Fn BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex
|
||||
and
|
||||
.Fn BN_is_prime_ex ,
|
||||
a number of rounds of the probabilistic Miller-Rabin test is performed.
|
||||
If
|
||||
.Fa checks
|
||||
is positive, it is used as the number of rounds;
|
||||
if it is zero or the special value
|
||||
.Dv BN_prime_checks ,
|
||||
a suitable number of rounds is calculated from the bit length of
|
||||
.Fa a .
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
If
|
||||
.Dv NULL
|
||||
is passed for the
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
.\" $OpenBSD: EVP_AEAD_CTX_init.3,v 1.10 2022/01/10 22:44:22 tb Exp $
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: EVP_AEAD_CTX_init.3,v 1.11 2023/05/09 07:19:24 tb Exp $
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.\" Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
|
||||
.\" Parts of the text were written by Adam Langley and David Benjamin.
|
||||
|
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
|
|||
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
|
||||
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: January 10 2022 $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 9 2023 $
|
||||
.Dt EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT 3
|
||||
.Os
|
||||
.Sh NAME
|
||||
|
|
@ -266,9 +266,14 @@ It is also safer to use as it prevents common mistakes with the native APIs.
|
|||
.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_new
|
||||
returns the new
|
||||
.Vt EVP_AEAD_CTX
|
||||
object or
|
||||
object on success;
|
||||
otherwise
|
||||
.Dv NULL
|
||||
on failure.
|
||||
is returned and
|
||||
.Va errno
|
||||
is set to
|
||||
.Er ENOMEM .
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_init ,
|
||||
.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_open ,
|
||||
and
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
.\" $OpenBSD: RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl.3,v 1.6 2023/04/16 23:19:28 tb Exp $
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl.3,v 1.7 2023/05/05 12:22:21 tb Exp $
|
||||
.\" full merge up to:
|
||||
.\" OpenSSL man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod 99d63d46 Oct 26 13:56:48 2016 -0400
|
||||
.\" OpenSSL man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md.pod
|
||||
|
|
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
|
|||
.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
||||
.\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 16 2023 $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 5 2023 $
|
||||
.Dt RSA_PKEY_CTX_CTRL 3
|
||||
.Os
|
||||
.Sh NAME
|
||||
|
|
@ -189,15 +189,12 @@ for PKCS#1 padding,
|
|||
for no padding,
|
||||
.Dv RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
|
||||
for OAEP padding (encrypt and decrypt only),
|
||||
and
|
||||
.Dv RSA_X931_PADDING
|
||||
for X9.31 padding (signature operations only) and
|
||||
.Dv RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
|
||||
(sign and verify only).
|
||||
Only the last one can be used with keys of the type
|
||||
.Dv EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS .
|
||||
X9.31 padding mode is unsupported.
|
||||
.Dv RSA_X931_PADDING
|
||||
is provided for backward compatibility with some existing
|
||||
application software.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
Two RSA padding modes behave differently if
|
||||
.Xr EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md 3
|
||||
|
|
@ -209,6 +206,8 @@ structure according to PKCS#1 when signing and this structure is
|
|||
expected (and stripped off) when verifying.
|
||||
If this control is not used with RSA and PKCS#1 padding then the
|
||||
supplied data is used directly and not encapsulated.
|
||||
In the case of X9.31 padding for RSA the algorithm identifier byte is
|
||||
added or checked and removed if this control is called.
|
||||
If it is not called then the first byte of the plaintext buffer is
|
||||
expected to be the algorithm identifier byte.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
.\" $OpenBSD: X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.3,v 1.14 2023/05/02 14:13:05 beck Exp $
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.3,v 1.15 2023/05/03 08:10:23 beck Exp $
|
||||
.\" OpenSSL aebb9aac Jul 19 09:27:53 2016 -0400
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.\" This file was written by Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>.
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
|
|||
.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
||||
.\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 2 2023 $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 3 2023 $
|
||||
.Dt X509_NAME_GET_INDEX_BY_NID 3
|
||||
.Os
|
||||
.Sh NAME
|
||||
|
|
@ -136,32 +136,22 @@ run from 0 to
|
|||
.Fn X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID
|
||||
and
|
||||
.Fn X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ
|
||||
retrieve the bytes encoded as UTF-8 from the first entry in
|
||||
retrieve the "text" from the first entry in
|
||||
.Fa name
|
||||
which matches
|
||||
.Fa nid
|
||||
or
|
||||
.Fa obj .
|
||||
At most
|
||||
.Fa len
|
||||
bytes will be written and the text written to
|
||||
.Fa buf
|
||||
will be NUL terminated.
|
||||
If
|
||||
.Fa buf
|
||||
is
|
||||
.Dv NULL ,
|
||||
nothing is written, but the return value is calculated as usual.
|
||||
If
|
||||
.Fa buf
|
||||
is not
|
||||
.Dv NULL ,
|
||||
no more than
|
||||
.Fa len
|
||||
bytes will be written and the text written to
|
||||
.Fa buf
|
||||
will be NUL terminated.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
Nothing is written and it is a failure if
|
||||
.Fa len
|
||||
is not large enough to hold the NUL byte terminated UTF-8 encoding of
|
||||
the text, or if the UTF-8 encoding ot the text would contins a NUL
|
||||
byte.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
All relevant
|
||||
.Dv NID_*
|
||||
|
|
@ -199,8 +189,8 @@ if the index is invalid.
|
|||
.Fn X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID
|
||||
and
|
||||
.Fn X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ
|
||||
return the length of the output UTF-8 string written, not counting the
|
||||
terminating NUL, or -1 in the case of an error or no match being found.
|
||||
return the length of the output string written, not counting the
|
||||
terminating NUL, or -1 if no match is found.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
In some cases of failure of
|
||||
.Fn X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
.\" $OpenBSD: s2i_ASN1_INTEGER.3,v 1.4 2023/04/21 13:08:16 tb Exp $
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: s2i_ASN1_INTEGER.3,v 1.5 2023/05/12 08:12:09 tb Exp $
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.\" Copyright (c) 2023 Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
|||
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
|
||||
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 21 2023 $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 12 2023 $
|
||||
.Dt I2S_ASN1_INTEGER 3
|
||||
.Os
|
||||
.Sh NAME
|
||||
|
|
@ -135,8 +135,9 @@ The
|
|||
and
|
||||
.Fa ctx
|
||||
arguments are ignored.
|
||||
Every pair of hexadecimal digits is converted into an octet, while
|
||||
any number of colons separating two pairs are ignored.
|
||||
Every pair of hexadecimal digits is converted into an octet.
|
||||
Colons are ignored if they are at the start, the end or
|
||||
if they separate two pairs of digits.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
.Fn i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE
|
||||
uses strings provided in the usr_data field of the non-NULL
|
||||
|
|
@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ or NULL on error.
|
|||
Error conditions are memory allocation failure or if
|
||||
.Fa value
|
||||
contains an odd number of hexadecimal digits or anything except
|
||||
colons between pairs of hexadecimal digits.
|
||||
colons at the start, the end or between pairs of hexadecimal digits.
|
||||
.Pp
|
||||
Error codes can sometimes be obtained by
|
||||
.Xr ERR_get_error 3 .
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: xts128.c,v 1.9 2022/11/26 16:08:53 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: xts128.c,v 1.10 2023/05/07 14:38:04 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* ====================================================================
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char iv[16],
|
|||
}
|
||||
if (enc) {
|
||||
for (i=0;i<len;++i) {
|
||||
u8 c = inp[i];
|
||||
u8 ch = inp[i];
|
||||
out[i] = scratch.c[i];
|
||||
scratch.c[i] = c;
|
||||
scratch.c[i] = ch;
|
||||
}
|
||||
scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
|
||||
scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
|
||||
|
|
@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char iv[16],
|
|||
scratch.u[1] ^= tweak1.u[1];
|
||||
|
||||
for (i=0;i<len;++i) {
|
||||
u8 c = inp[16+i];
|
||||
u8 ch = inp[16+i];
|
||||
out[16+i] = scratch.c[i];
|
||||
scratch.c[i] = c;
|
||||
scratch.c[i] = ch;
|
||||
}
|
||||
scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0];
|
||||
scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1];
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.63 2023/04/25 16:50:33 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.64 2023/05/05 12:30:40 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ typedef struct rsa_oaep_params_st {
|
|||
#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
|
||||
#define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
|
||||
#define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
|
||||
/* Leave this for now as rust-openssl and erlang expose it. */
|
||||
/* rust-openssl and erlang expose this and salt even uses it. */
|
||||
#define RSA_X931_PADDING 5
|
||||
/* EVP_PKEY_ only */
|
||||
#define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING 6
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_eay.c,v 1.59 2023/04/15 18:48:52 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_eay.c,v 1.60 2023/05/05 12:21:44 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -382,11 +382,14 @@ RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
|
|||
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
|
||||
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
|
||||
i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
|
||||
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (i <= 0)
|
||||
|
|
@ -446,11 +449,14 @@ RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
|
|||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
res = ret;
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
|
||||
res = f;
|
||||
else
|
||||
res = ret;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
res = ret;
|
||||
|
||||
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
|
||||
* length of the modulus */
|
||||
|
|
@ -661,10 +667,9 @@ RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
|
|||
rsa->_method_mod_n))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING && (ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
p = buf;
|
||||
i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
|
||||
|
|
@ -673,6 +678,9 @@ RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
|
|||
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
|
||||
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
|
||||
r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
|
||||
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_local.h,v 1.1 2022/11/26 16:08:54 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_local.h,v 1.2 2023/05/05 12:21:44 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
|
||||
__BEGIN_HIDDEN_DECLS
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -91,4 +91,10 @@ extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
|
|||
unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa);
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
|
||||
int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
|
||||
int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid);
|
||||
|
||||
__END_HIDDEN_DECLS
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_pmeth.c,v 1.37 2023/04/25 15:48:48 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_pmeth.c,v 1.38 2023/05/05 12:21:44 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
|
||||
* project 2006.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int
|
|||
pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = -1;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -197,11 +197,21 @@ pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
|||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
||||
if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
|
||||
RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
|
||||
rctx->tbuf[tbslen] =
|
||||
RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
|
||||
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, sig,
|
||||
rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
|
||||
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
||||
unsigned int sltmp;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig,
|
||||
|
|
@ -217,6 +227,8 @@ pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
|||
return -1;
|
||||
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
|
||||
sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
|
||||
|
|
@ -236,16 +248,36 @@ pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
|
|||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->md) {
|
||||
size_t sltmp;
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
|
||||
ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
|
||||
if (ret < 1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ret--;
|
||||
if (rctx->tbuf[ret] !=
|
||||
RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (rout)
|
||||
memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
|
||||
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
||||
size_t sltmp;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
|
||||
ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0,
|
||||
rout, &sltmp, sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ret = sltmp;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0,
|
||||
rout, &sltmp, sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ret = sltmp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode);
|
||||
|
|
@ -263,7 +295,6 @@ pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
|
|||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
||||
size_t rslen;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->md) {
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
|
||||
|
|
@ -273,22 +304,30 @@ pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
|
|||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
||||
if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig,
|
||||
siglen) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
|
||||
rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md,
|
||||
rctx->mgf1md, rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
|
||||
rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md,
|
||||
rctx->mgf1md, rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -365,34 +404,41 @@ check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
|
|||
if (md == NULL)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING || padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
||||
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* List of all supported RSA digests. */
|
||||
/* RFC 8017 and NIST CSOR. */
|
||||
switch(EVP_MD_type(md)) {
|
||||
case NID_sha1:
|
||||
case NID_sha224:
|
||||
case NID_sha256:
|
||||
case NID_sha384:
|
||||
case NID_sha512:
|
||||
case NID_sha512_224:
|
||||
case NID_sha512_256:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_224:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_256:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_384:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_512:
|
||||
case NID_md5:
|
||||
case NID_md5_sha1:
|
||||
case NID_md4:
|
||||
case NID_ripemd160:
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
||||
if (RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)) == -1) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* List of all supported RSA digests. */
|
||||
/* RFC 8017 and NIST CSOR. */
|
||||
switch(EVP_MD_type(md)) {
|
||||
case NID_sha1:
|
||||
case NID_sha224:
|
||||
case NID_sha256:
|
||||
case NID_sha384:
|
||||
case NID_sha512:
|
||||
case NID_sha512_224:
|
||||
case NID_sha512_256:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_224:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_256:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_384:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_512:
|
||||
case NID_md5:
|
||||
case NID_md5_sha1:
|
||||
case NID_md4:
|
||||
case NID_ripemd160:
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -598,6 +644,8 @@ pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)
|
|||
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
|
||||
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
|
||||
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
|
||||
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
164
lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c
Normal file
164
lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_x931.c,v 1.12 2023/05/05 12:19:37 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
|
||||
* project 2005.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/* ====================================================================
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
||||
* are met:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
||||
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
||||
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
||||
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
||||
* distribution.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
||||
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
||||
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
||||
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
||||
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
||||
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
||||
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
||||
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
||||
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
||||
* acknowledgment:
|
||||
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
||||
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
|
||||
*
|
||||
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
||||
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
||||
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
||||
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
||||
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
||||
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
||||
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
||||
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
||||
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
||||
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
||||
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
||||
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
* ====================================================================
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
||||
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
||||
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
int flen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int j;
|
||||
unsigned char *p;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Absolute minimum amount of padding is 1 header nibble, 1 padding
|
||||
* nibble and 2 trailer bytes: but 1 hash if is already in 'from'.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
j = tlen - flen - 2;
|
||||
|
||||
if (j < 0) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p = (unsigned char *)to;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If no padding start and end nibbles are in one byte */
|
||||
if (j == 0)
|
||||
*p++ = 0x6A;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
*p++ = 0x6B;
|
||||
if (j > 1) {
|
||||
memset(p, 0xBB, j - 1);
|
||||
p += j - 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
*p++ = 0xBA;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(p, from, flen);
|
||||
p += flen;
|
||||
*p = 0xCC;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
int flen, int num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i = 0, j;
|
||||
const unsigned char *p = from;
|
||||
|
||||
if (num != flen || (*p != 0x6A && *p != 0x6B)) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (*p++ == 0x6B) {
|
||||
j = flen - 3;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
|
||||
unsigned char c = *p++;
|
||||
if (c == 0xBA)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
if (c != 0xBB) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (i == 0) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
j -= i;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
j = flen - 2;
|
||||
|
||||
if (j < 0 || p[j] != 0xCC) {
|
||||
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(to, p, j);
|
||||
|
||||
return j;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Translate between X931 hash ids and NIDs */
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (nid) {
|
||||
case NID_sha1:
|
||||
return 0x33;
|
||||
case NID_sha256:
|
||||
return 0x34;
|
||||
case NID_sha384:
|
||||
return 0x36;
|
||||
case NID_sha512:
|
||||
return 0x35;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: sha512.c,v 1.34 2023/04/14 10:45:15 jsing Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: sha512.c,v 1.35 2023/05/12 10:10:55 jsing Exp $ */
|
||||
/* ====================================================================
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -153,137 +153,6 @@ static const SHA_LONG64 K512[80] = {
|
|||
#define Ch(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
|
||||
#define Maj(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This code should give better results on 32-bit CPU with less than
|
||||
* ~24 registers, both size and performance wise...
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void
|
||||
sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const SHA_LONG64 *W = in;
|
||||
SHA_LONG64 A, E, T;
|
||||
SHA_LONG64 X[9 + 80], *F;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
while (num--) {
|
||||
|
||||
F = X + 80;
|
||||
A = ctx->h[0];
|
||||
F[1] = ctx->h[1];
|
||||
F[2] = ctx->h[2];
|
||||
F[3] = ctx->h[3];
|
||||
E = ctx->h[4];
|
||||
F[5] = ctx->h[5];
|
||||
F[6] = ctx->h[6];
|
||||
F[7] = ctx->h[7];
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, F--) {
|
||||
T = PULL64(W[i]);
|
||||
F[0] = A;
|
||||
F[4] = E;
|
||||
F[8] = T;
|
||||
T += F[7] + Sigma1(E) + Ch(E, F[5], F[6]) + K512[i];
|
||||
E = F[3] + T;
|
||||
A = T + Sigma0(A) + Maj(A, F[1], F[2]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (; i < 80; i++, F--) {
|
||||
T = sigma0(F[8 + 16 - 1]);
|
||||
T += sigma1(F[8 + 16 - 14]);
|
||||
T += F[8 + 16] + F[8 + 16 - 9];
|
||||
|
||||
F[0] = A;
|
||||
F[4] = E;
|
||||
F[8] = T;
|
||||
T += F[7] + Sigma1(E) + Ch(E, F[5], F[6]) + K512[i];
|
||||
E = F[3] + T;
|
||||
A = T + Sigma0(A) + Maj(A, F[1], F[2]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx->h[0] += A;
|
||||
ctx->h[1] += F[1];
|
||||
ctx->h[2] += F[2];
|
||||
ctx->h[3] += F[3];
|
||||
ctx->h[4] += E;
|
||||
ctx->h[5] += F[5];
|
||||
ctx->h[6] += F[6];
|
||||
ctx->h[7] += F[7];
|
||||
|
||||
W += SHA_LBLOCK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
|
||||
|
||||
static void
|
||||
sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const SHA_LONG64 *W = in;
|
||||
SHA_LONG64 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1, T2;
|
||||
SHA_LONG64 X[16];
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
while (num--) {
|
||||
|
||||
a = ctx->h[0];
|
||||
b = ctx->h[1];
|
||||
c = ctx->h[2];
|
||||
d = ctx->h[3];
|
||||
e = ctx->h[4];
|
||||
f = ctx->h[5];
|
||||
g = ctx->h[6];
|
||||
h = ctx->h[7];
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
|
||||
T1 = X[i] = PULL64(W[i]);
|
||||
T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i];
|
||||
T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
|
||||
h = g;
|
||||
g = f;
|
||||
f = e;
|
||||
e = d + T1;
|
||||
d = c;
|
||||
c = b;
|
||||
b = a;
|
||||
a = T1 + T2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (; i < 80; i++) {
|
||||
s0 = X[(i + 1)&0x0f];
|
||||
s0 = sigma0(s0);
|
||||
s1 = X[(i + 14)&0x0f];
|
||||
s1 = sigma1(s1);
|
||||
|
||||
T1 = X[i&0xf] += s0 + s1 + X[(i + 9)&0xf];
|
||||
T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i];
|
||||
T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
|
||||
h = g;
|
||||
g = f;
|
||||
f = e;
|
||||
e = d + T1;
|
||||
d = c;
|
||||
c = b;
|
||||
b = a;
|
||||
a = T1 + T2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx->h[0] += a;
|
||||
ctx->h[1] += b;
|
||||
ctx->h[2] += c;
|
||||
ctx->h[3] += d;
|
||||
ctx->h[4] += e;
|
||||
ctx->h[5] += f;
|
||||
ctx->h[6] += g;
|
||||
ctx->h[7] += h;
|
||||
|
||||
W += SHA_LBLOCK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#else
|
||||
|
||||
#define ROUND_00_15(i, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) do { \
|
||||
T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i]; \
|
||||
h = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); \
|
||||
|
|
@ -379,8 +248,6 @@ sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num)
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* SHA512_ASM */
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_local.h,v 1.7 2023/04/28 16:30:14 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_local.h,v 1.8 2023/05/08 14:51:00 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
|
||||
* project 2013.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -327,10 +327,10 @@ struct x509_store_ctx_st {
|
|||
/* The following are set by the caller */
|
||||
X509 *cert; /* The cert to check */
|
||||
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted; /* chain of X509s - untrusted - passed in */
|
||||
STACK_OF(X509) *trusted; /* trusted stack for use with get_issuer() */
|
||||
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls; /* set of CRLs passed in */
|
||||
|
||||
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
|
||||
void *other_ctx; /* Other info for use with get_issuer() */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Callbacks for various operations */
|
||||
int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* called to verify a certificate */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_prn.c,v 1.5 2023/02/16 08:38:17 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_prn.c,v 1.6 2023/05/08 05:30:38 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
|
||||
* project 1999.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ X509V3_extensions_print(BIO *bp, const char *title,
|
|||
obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex);
|
||||
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj);
|
||||
j = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex);
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, ": %s\n",j?"critical":"") <= 0)
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, ":%s\n", j ? " critical" : "") <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, flag, indent + 4)) {
|
||||
BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", indent + 4, "");
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_utl.c,v 1.14 2023/04/23 11:52:14 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_utl.c,v 1.17 2023/05/12 19:02:10 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
|
||||
* project.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -55,9 +55,9 @@
|
|||
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/* X509 v3 extension utilities */
|
||||
|
||||
#include <ctype.h>
|
||||
#include <limits.h>
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
|
|||
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "bytestring.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static char *bn_to_string(const BIGNUM *bn);
|
||||
static char *strip_spaces(char *name);
|
||||
static int sk_strcmp(const char * const *a, const char * const *b);
|
||||
|
|
@ -459,97 +461,148 @@ strip_spaces(char *name)
|
|||
return p;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* hex string utilities */
|
||||
static const char hex_digits[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
|
||||
|
||||
/* Given a buffer of length 'len' return a malloc'ed string with its
|
||||
* hex representation
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char *
|
||||
hex_to_string(const unsigned char *buffer, long len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char *tmp, *q;
|
||||
const unsigned char *p;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
|
||||
CBB cbb;
|
||||
CBS cbs;
|
||||
uint8_t *out = NULL;
|
||||
uint8_t c;
|
||||
size_t out_len;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (len < 0)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
if (len == 0)
|
||||
return calloc(1, 1);
|
||||
if ((tmp = calloc(len, 3)) == NULL) {
|
||||
X509V3error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
CBS_init(&cbs, buffer, len);
|
||||
while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
|
||||
if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &c))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hex_digits[c >> 4]))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hex_digits[c & 0xf]))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, ':'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
q = tmp;
|
||||
for (i = 0, p = buffer; i < len; i++, p++) {
|
||||
*q++ = hexdig[(*p >> 4) & 0xf];
|
||||
*q++ = hexdig[*p & 0xf];
|
||||
*q++ = ':';
|
||||
}
|
||||
q[-1] = 0;
|
||||
return tmp;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, '\0'))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
||||
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(hex_to_string);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Give a string of hex digits convert to
|
||||
* a buffer
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int
|
||||
x509_skip_colons_cbs(CBS *cbs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint8_t c;
|
||||
|
||||
while (CBS_len(cbs) > 0) {
|
||||
if (!CBS_peek_u8(cbs, &c))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (c != ':')
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &c))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
x509_get_xdigit_nibble_cbs(CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_nibble)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint8_t c;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &c))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
|
||||
*out_nibble = c - '0';
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
|
||||
*out_nibble = c - 'a' + 10;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
|
||||
*out_nibble = c - 'A' + 10;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
X509V3error(X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
unsigned char *
|
||||
string_to_hex(const char *str, long *len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *hexbuf, *q;
|
||||
unsigned char ch, cl, *p;
|
||||
if (!str) {
|
||||
X509V3error(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!(hexbuf = malloc(strlen(str) >> 1)))
|
||||
CBB cbb;
|
||||
CBS cbs;
|
||||
uint8_t *out = NULL;
|
||||
size_t out_len;
|
||||
uint8_t hi, lo;
|
||||
|
||||
*len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
for (p = (unsigned char *)str, q = hexbuf; *p; ) {
|
||||
ch = *p++;
|
||||
if (ch == ':')
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
cl = *p++;
|
||||
if (!cl) {
|
||||
X509V3error(X509V3_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS);
|
||||
free(hexbuf);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ch = tolower(ch);
|
||||
cl = tolower(cl);
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9'))
|
||||
ch -= '0';
|
||||
else if ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'f'))
|
||||
ch -= 'a' - 10;
|
||||
else
|
||||
goto badhex;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((cl >= '0') && (cl <= '9'))
|
||||
cl -= '0';
|
||||
else if ((cl >= 'a') && (cl <= 'f'))
|
||||
cl -= 'a' - 10;
|
||||
else
|
||||
goto badhex;
|
||||
|
||||
*q++ = (ch << 4) | cl;
|
||||
if (str == NULL) {
|
||||
X509V3error(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (len)
|
||||
*len = q - hexbuf;
|
||||
CBS_init(&cbs, str, strlen(str));
|
||||
while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Skipping only a single colon between two pairs of digits
|
||||
* would make more sense - history...
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!x509_skip_colons_cbs(&cbs))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* Another historic idiocy. */
|
||||
if (CBS_len(&cbs) == 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
if (!x509_get_xdigit_nibble_cbs(&cbs, &hi))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (CBS_len(&cbs) == 0) {
|
||||
X509V3error(X509V3_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!x509_get_xdigit_nibble_cbs(&cbs, &lo))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hi << 4 | lo))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return hexbuf;
|
||||
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (out_len > LONG_MAX) {
|
||||
freezero(out, out_len);
|
||||
out = NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*len = out_len;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
free(hexbuf);
|
||||
X509V3error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
||||
|
||||
badhex:
|
||||
free(hexbuf);
|
||||
X509V3error(X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(string_to_hex);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_verify.c,v 1.65 2023/04/28 16:50:16 beck Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_verify.c,v 1.66 2023/05/07 07:11:50 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Bob Beck <beck@openbsd.org>
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -275,7 +275,6 @@ x509_verify_ctx_cert_is_root(struct x509_verify_ctx *ctx, X509 *cert,
|
|||
cert)) != NULL) {
|
||||
X509_free(match);
|
||||
return x509_verify_check_chain_end(cert, full_chain);
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Check the provided roots */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.120 2023/04/30 14:59:52 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.122 2023/05/08 14:51:00 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int X509_cmp_time_internal(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time,
|
|||
int clamp_notafter);
|
||||
|
||||
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
||||
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
|
||||
static int get_trusted_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
|
||||
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
|
||||
static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -592,7 +592,6 @@ X509_verify_cert_legacy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|||
int
|
||||
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
STACK_OF(X509) *roots = NULL;
|
||||
struct x509_verify_ctx *vctx = NULL;
|
||||
int chain_count = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -656,8 +655,6 @@ X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|||
}
|
||||
x509_verify_ctx_free(vctx);
|
||||
|
||||
sk_X509_pop_free(roots, X509_free);
|
||||
|
||||
/* if we succeed we have a chain in ctx->chain */
|
||||
return (chain_count > 0 && ctx->chain != NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -697,12 +694,12 @@ check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *subject, X509 *issuer)
|
|||
return X509_check_issued(issuer, subject) == X509_V_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
|
||||
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in ctx->trusted */
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
||||
get_trusted_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
||||
{
|
||||
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x, 1);
|
||||
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->trusted, x, 1);
|
||||
if (*issuer) {
|
||||
CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -2437,17 +2434,17 @@ LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_init);
|
|||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *trusted)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ctx->other_ctx = sk;
|
||||
ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, trusted);
|
||||
}
|
||||
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack);
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *trusted)
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, sk);
|
||||
ctx->trusted = trusted;
|
||||
ctx->get_issuer = get_trusted_issuer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: x509name.c,v 1.32 2023/05/02 14:13:05 beck Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: x509name.c,v 1.34 2023/05/03 08:10:23 beck Exp $ */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -66,7 +66,6 @@
|
|||
#include <openssl/stack.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/x509.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "bytestring.h"
|
||||
#include "x509_local.h"
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
|
|
@ -85,37 +84,21 @@ int
|
|||
X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,
|
||||
int len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *text = NULL;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
ASN1_STRING *data;
|
||||
int i, text_len;
|
||||
int ret = -1;
|
||||
CBS cbs;
|
||||
|
||||
i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, -1);
|
||||
if (i < 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Fail if we cannot encode as UTF-8, or if the UTF-8 encoding of the
|
||||
* string contains a 0 byte, because mortal callers seldom handle the
|
||||
* length difference correctly
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((text_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&text, data)) < 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
CBS_init(&cbs, text, text_len);
|
||||
if (CBS_contains_zero_byte(&cbs))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* We still support the "pass NULL to find out how much" API */
|
||||
if (buf != NULL) {
|
||||
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cbs, buf, len - 1, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* It must be a C string */
|
||||
buf[text_len] = '\0';
|
||||
i = (data->length > (len - 1)) ? (len - 1) : data->length;
|
||||
if (buf == NULL)
|
||||
return (data->length);
|
||||
if (i >= 0) {
|
||||
memcpy(buf, data->data, i);
|
||||
buf[i] = '\0';
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = text_len;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
free(text);
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
return (i);
|
||||
}
|
||||
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue