sync

lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c

@@ -0,0 +1,818 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ecdsa.c,v 1.10 2023/07/05 17:10:10 tb Exp $ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "bn_local.h"
+#include "ec_local.h"
+#include "ecdsa_local.h"
+
+static const ASN1_TEMPLATE ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt[] = {
+	{
+		.flags = 0,
+		.tag = 0,
+		.offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, r),
+		.field_name = "r",
+		.item = &BIGNUM_it,
+	},
+	{
+		.flags = 0,
+		.tag = 0,
+		.offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, s),
+		.field_name = "s",
+		.item = &BIGNUM_it,
+	},
+};
+
+const ASN1_ITEM ECDSA_SIG_it = {
+	.itype = ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,
+	.utype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+	.templates = ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt,
+	.tcount = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),
+	.funcs = NULL,
+	.size = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG),
+	.sname = "ECDSA_SIG",
+};
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+	return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len,
+	    &ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+int
+i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+	return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ECDSA_SIG_new(void)
+{
+	return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_new(&ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+void
+ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *a)
+{
+	ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
+}
+
+void
+ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+	if (pr != NULL)
+		*pr = sig->r;
+	if (ps != NULL)
+		*ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
+{
+	return sig->r;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
+{
+	return sig->s;
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+	if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	BN_free(sig->r);
+	BN_free(sig->s);
+	sig->r = r;
+	sig->s = s;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
+{
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+	ECDSA_SIG sig;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (r == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	sig.r = (BIGNUM *)order;
+	sig.s = (BIGNUM *)order;
+
+	if ((ret = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(&sig, NULL)) < 0)
+		ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 2: convert hashed message into an integer.
+ * Use the order_bits leftmost bits if it exceeds the group order.
+ */
+static int
+ecdsa_prepare_digest(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    const EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *e)
+{
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	int digest_bits, order_bits;
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, e) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	order_bits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
+
+	digest_bits = 8 * digest_len;
+	if (digest_bits <= order_bits)
+		return 1;
+
+	return BN_rshift(e, e, digest_bits - order_bits);
+}
+
+int
+ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+    const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	ECDSA_SIG *sig;
+	int out_len = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, kinv, r, key)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((out_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &signature)) < 0) {
+		out_len = 0;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+	*signature_len = out_len;
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, steps 3-8 and 11: Generate k, calculate r and
+ * kinv. If r == 0, try again with a new random k.
+ */
+
+int
+ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv, BIGNUM **out_r)
+{
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *order;
+	BIGNUM *x;
+	int order_bits;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	BN_free(*out_kinv);
+	*out_kinv = NULL;
+
+	BN_free(*out_r);
+	*out_r = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if ((k = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((ctx = in_ctx) == NULL)
+		ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	if (ctx == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+	if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (BN_cmp(order, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Reject curves with an order that is smaller than 80 bits. */
+	if ((order_bits = BN_num_bits(order)) < 80) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Preallocate space. */
+	if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) ||
+	    !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) ||
+	    !BN_set_bit(x, order_bits))
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Step 11: repeat until r != 0. */
+	do {
+		/* Step 3: generate random k. */
+		if (!bn_rand_interval(k, BN_value_one(), order))
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+		 * so we compute G * k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+		 * bit-length.
+		 *
+		 * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent
+		 * a small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum
+		 * that is one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the
+		 * code path used in the constant time implementations
+		 * elsewhere.
+		 *
+		 * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+		 * conditional copy.
+		 */
+		if (!BN_add(r, k, order) ||
+		    !BN_add(x, r, order) ||
+		    !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : x))
+			goto err;
+
+		BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+		/* Step 5: P = k * G. */
+		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+			ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		/* Steps 6 (and 7): from P = (x, y) retain the x-coordinate. */
+		if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL,
+		    ctx)) {
+			ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		/* Step 8: r = x (mod order). */
+		if (!BN_nnmod(r, x, order, ctx)) {
+			ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+	} while (BN_is_zero(r));
+
+	/* Step 4: calculate kinv. */
+	if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(k, k, order, ctx) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	*out_kinv = k;
+	k = NULL;
+
+	*out_r = r;
+	r = NULL;
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+	if (ctx != in_ctx)
+		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	BN_free(k);
+	BN_free(r);
+	EC_POINT_free(point);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.1, step 9: compute s = inv(k)(e + xr) mod order.
+ * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack, the following
+ * is calculated using a random blinding value b in [1, order):
+ * s = inv(b)(be + bxr)inv(k) mod order.
+ */
+
+static int
+ecdsa_compute_s(BIGNUM **out_s, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+    const BIGNUM *r, const EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	const BIGNUM *order, *priv_key;
+	BIGNUM *b, *binv, *be, *bxr;
+	BIGNUM *s = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	*out_s = NULL;
+
+	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+	if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if ((priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((binv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((be = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((bxr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * In a valid ECDSA signature, r must be in [1, order). Since r can be
+	 * caller provided - either directly or by replacing sign_setup() - we
+	 * can't rely on this being the case.
+	 */
+	if (BN_cmp(r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(r, order) >= 0) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!bn_rand_interval(b, BN_value_one(), order)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(binv, b, order, ctx) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, b, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, bxr, r, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!BN_mod_mul(be, b, e, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!BN_mod_add(s, be, bxr, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	/* s = b(e + xr)k^-1 */
+	if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	/* s = (e + xr)k^-1 */
+	if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, binv, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Step 11: if s == 0 start over. */
+	if (!BN_is_zero(s)) {
+		*out_s = s;
+		s = NULL;
+	}
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+	BN_free(s);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * It is too expensive to check curve parameters on every sign operation.
+ * Instead, cap the number of retries. A single retry is very unlikely, so
+ * allowing 32 retries is amply enough.
+ */
+#define ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS		32
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5: Section 6.4.1: ECDSA signature generation, steps 2-12.
+ * The caller provides the hash of the message, thus performs step 1.
+ * Step 10, zeroing k and kinv, is done by BN_free().
+ */
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *e;
+	int caller_supplied_values = 0;
+	int attempts = 0;
+	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+	if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Step 2: convert hash into an integer. */
+	if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Use the caller's kinv and r. Don't call ECDSA_sign_setup().
+		 * If we're unable to compute a valid signature, the caller
+		 * must provide new values.
+		 */
+		caller_supplied_values = 1;
+
+		if ((kinv = BN_dup(in_kinv)) == NULL) {
+			ECerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if ((r = BN_dup(in_r)) == NULL) {
+			ECerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	do {
+		/* Steps 3-8: calculate kinv and r. */
+		if (!caller_supplied_values) {
+			if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
+				ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Steps 9 and 11: if s is non-NULL, we have a valid signature.
+		 */
+		if (!ecdsa_compute_s(&s, e, kinv, r, key, ctx))
+			goto err;
+		if (s != NULL)
+			break;
+
+		if (caller_supplied_values) {
+			ECerror(EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (++attempts > ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS) {
+			ECerror(EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
+			goto err;
+		}
+	} while (1);
+
+	/* Step 12: output (r, s). */
+	if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s)) {
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	r = NULL;
+	s = NULL;
+
+ err:
+	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	BN_free(kinv);
+	BN_free(r);
+	BN_free(s);
+
+	return sig;
+}
+
+int
+ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	ECDSA_SIG *s;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	const unsigned char *p;
+	int der_len = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if ((s = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	p = sigbuf;
+	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage. */
+	if ((der_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der)) != sig_len)
+		goto err;
+	if (timingsafe_memcmp(sigbuf, der, der_len))
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, s, key);
+
+ err:
+	freezero(der, der_len);
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 186-5, section 6.4.2: ECDSA signature verification.
+ * The caller provides us with the hash of the message, so has performed step 2.
+ */
+
+int
+ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	const EC_POINT *pub_key;
+	EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *order;
+	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *e, *sinv, *u, *v, *x;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (key == NULL || sig == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if ((pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+	if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((sinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Step 1: verify that r and s are in the range [1, order). */
+	if (BN_cmp(sig->r, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->r, order) >= 0) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+		ret = 0;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (BN_cmp(sig->s, BN_value_one()) < 0 || BN_cmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+		ret = 0;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Step 3: convert the hash into an integer. */
+	if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(digest, digest_len, key, e))
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Step 4: compute the inverse of s modulo order. */
+	if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(sinv, sig->s, order, ctx) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	/* Step 5: compute u = s^-1 * e and v = s^-1 * r (modulo order). */
+	if (!BN_mod_mul(u, e, sinv, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!BN_mod_mul(v, sig->r, sinv, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Steps 6 and 7: compute R = G * u + pub_key * v = (x, y). Reject if
+	 * it's the point at infinity - getting affine coordinates fails. Keep
+	 * the x coordinate.
+	 */
+	if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u, pub_key, v, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, NULL, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	/* Step 8: convert x to a number in [0, order). */
+	if (!BN_nnmod(x, x, order, ctx)) {
+		ECerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Step 9: the signature is valid iff the x-coordinate is equal to r. */
+	ret = (BN_cmp(x, sig->r) == 0);
+
+ err:
+	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	EC_POINT_free(point);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *
+ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *out_r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	if (key->meth->sign_sig == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return key->meth->sign_sig(digest, digest_len, kinv, out_r, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, digest, digest_len, signature, signature_len,
+	    NULL, NULL, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+    const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	if (key->meth->sign == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return key->meth->sign(type, digest, digest_len, signature,
+	    signature_len, kinv, r, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
+    BIGNUM **out_r)
+{
+	if (key->meth->sign_setup == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return key->meth->sign_setup(key, in_ctx, out_kinv, out_r);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	if (key->meth->verify_sig == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return key->meth->verify_sig(digest, digest_len, sig, key);
+}
+
+int
+ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	if (key->meth->verify == NULL) {
+		ECerror(EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return key->meth->verify(type, digest, digest_len, sigbuf, sig_len, key);
+}

lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_local.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_local.h,v 1.3 2023/06/25 18:45:56 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ecdsa_local.h,v 1.1 2023/07/05 11:37:46 tb Exp $ */
 /*
  * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
  */
@@ -68,12 +68,12 @@ struct ECDSA_SIG_st {
 	BIGNUM *s;
 };
 
-int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-    BIGNUM **rp);
-int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
-    unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv,
+int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
+    BIGNUM **out_r);
+int ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
+    unsigned char *signature, unsigned int *signature_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
     const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey);
-ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *digest, int digest_len,
     const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey);
 
 __END_HIDDEN_DECLS

lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_asn1.c

@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_asn1.c,v 1.14 2023/03/25 09:09:28 tb Exp $ */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "ecs_local.h"
-
-static const ASN1_TEMPLATE ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt[] = {
-	{
-		.flags = 0,
-		.tag = 0,
-		.offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, r),
-		.field_name = "r",
-		.item = &BIGNUM_it,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags = 0,
-		.tag = 0,
-		.offset = offsetof(ECDSA_SIG, s),
-		.field_name = "s",
-		.item = &BIGNUM_it,
-	},
-};
-
-const ASN1_ITEM ECDSA_SIG_it = {
-	.itype = ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,
-	.utype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
-	.templates = ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt,
-	.tcount = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),
-	.funcs = NULL,
-	.size = sizeof(ECDSA_SIG),
-	.sname = "ECDSA_SIG",
-};
-
-ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void);
-void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *a);
-ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **in, long len);
-int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **out);
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
-{
-	return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len,
-	    &ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-int
-i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **out)
-{
-	return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_SIG_new(void)
-{
-	return (ECDSA_SIG *)ASN1_item_new(&ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-void
-ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *a)
-{
-	ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, &ECDSA_SIG_it);
-}
-
-void
-ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
-{
-	if (pr != NULL)
-		*pr = sig->r;
-	if (ps != NULL)
-		*ps = sig->s;
-}
-
-const BIGNUM *
-ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
-{
-	return sig->r;
-}
-
-const BIGNUM *
-ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
-{
-	return sig->s;
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
-{
-	if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	BN_free(sig->r);
-	BN_free(sig->s);
-	sig->r = r;
-	sig->s = s;
-	return 1;
-}

lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_lib.c,v 1.22 2023/06/25 19:33:39 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ecs_lib.c,v 1.24 2023/07/05 11:37:46 tb Exp $ */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -64,15 +64,15 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
 #include "ec_local.h"
-#include "ecs_local.h"
+#include "ecdsa_local.h"
 
 static const ECDSA_METHOD *default_ECDSA_method = NULL;
 
 static const ECDSA_METHOD openssl_ecdsa_meth = {
 	.name = "OpenSSL ECDSA method",
-	.ecdsa_do_sign = ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig,
-	.ecdsa_sign_setup = ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup,
-	.ecdsa_do_verify = ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig,
+	.ecdsa_do_sign = ecdsa_sign_sig,
+	.ecdsa_sign_setup = ecdsa_sign_setup,
+	.ecdsa_do_verify = ecdsa_verify_sig,
 };
 
 const ECDSA_METHOD *

lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c

@@ -1,614 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_ossl.c,v 1.37 2023/06/25 19:33:39 tb Exp $ */
-/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-#include "bn_local.h"
-#include "ec_local.h"
-#include "ecs_local.h"
-
-static int ecdsa_prepare_digest(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-    BIGNUM *order, BIGNUM *ret);
-
-static int
-ecdsa_prepare_digest(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, BIGNUM *order,
-    BIGNUM *ret)
-{
-	int dgst_bits, order_bits;
-
-	if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, ret)) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	/* FIPS 186-3 6.4: Use order_bits leftmost bits if digest is too long */
-	dgst_bits = 8 * dgst_len;
-	order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
-	if (dgst_bits > order_bits) {
-		if (!BN_rshift(ret, ret, dgst_bits - order_bits)) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return 1;
-}
-
-int
-ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
-    unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	ECDSA_SIG *s;
-	int outlen = 0;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	if ((s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, kinv, r, eckey)) == NULL) {
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if ((outlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &sig)) < 0) {
-		outlen = 0;
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	ret = 1;
-
- err:
-	*siglen = outlen;
-	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-int
-ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
-{
-	BN_CTX *ctx = ctx_in;
-	BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL;
-	EC_POINT *point = NULL;
-	const EC_GROUP *group;
-	int order_bits, ret = 0;
-
-	if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (ctx == NULL) {
-		if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if ((k = BN_new()) == NULL || (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (order = BN_new()) == NULL || (X = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	if (BN_cmp(order, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
-		ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	/* Reject curves with an order that is smaller than 80 bits. */
-	if ((order_bits = BN_num_bits(order)) < 80) {
-		ECDSAerror(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	/* Preallocate space. */
-	if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) ||
-	    !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) ||
-	    !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
-		goto err;
-
-	do {
-		do {
-			if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
-				ECDSAerror(
-				    ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
-				goto err;
-			}
-		} while (BN_is_zero(k));
-
-		/*
-		 * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
-		 * so we compute G * k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
-		 * bit-length.
-		 *
-		 * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent
-		 * a small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum
-		 * that is one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the
-		 * code path used in the constant time implementations
-		 * elsewhere.
-		 *
-		 * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
-		 * conditional copy.
-		 */
-		if (!BN_add(r, k, order) ||
-		    !BN_add(X, r, order) ||
-		    !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
-			goto err;
-
-		BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-		/* Compute r, the x-coordinate of G * k. */
-		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, X, NULL,
-		    ctx)) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-	} while (BN_is_zero(r));
-
-	if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(k, k, order, ctx) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	BN_free(*rp);
-	BN_free(*kinvp);
-	*rp = r;
-	*kinvp = k;
-	ret = 1;
-
- err:
-	if (ret == 0) {
-		BN_free(k);
-		BN_free(r);
-	}
-	if (ctx_in == NULL)
-		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-	BN_free(order);
-	EC_POINT_free(point);
-	BN_free(X);
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * It is too expensive to check curve parameters on every sign operation.
- * Instead, cap the number of retries. A single retry is very unlikely, so
- * allowing 32 retries is amply enough.
- */
-#define ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS		32
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-    const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	BIGNUM *b = NULL, *binv = NULL, *bm = NULL, *bxr = NULL;
-	BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *m = NULL, *order = NULL, *range = NULL, *s;
-	const BIGNUM *ckinv, *priv_key;
-	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-	const EC_GROUP *group;
-	ECDSA_SIG  *ret;
-	int attempts = 0;
-	int ok = 0;
-
-	group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
-	priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
-
-	if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-
-	if ((ret = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	s = ret->s;
-
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (range = BN_new()) == NULL || (b = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (binv = BN_new()) == NULL || (bm = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (bxr = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(dgst, dgst_len, order, m))
-		goto err;
-
-	do {
-		if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
-			if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r)) {
-				ECDSAerror(ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-			}
-			ckinv = kinv;
-		} else {
-			ckinv = in_kinv;
-			if (!bn_copy(ret->r, in_r)) {
-				ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Compute:
-		 *
-		 *  s = inv(k)(m + xr) mod order
-		 *
-		 * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack,
-		 * the following is calculated using a blinding value:
-		 *
-		 *  s = inv(b)(bm + bxr)inv(k) mod order
-		 *
-		 * where b is a random value in the range [1, order-1].
-		 */
-
-		/* Generate b in range [1, order-1]. */
-		if (!BN_sub(range, order, BN_value_one())) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_rand_range(b, range)) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_add(b, b, BN_value_one())) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-		if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(binv, b, order, ctx) == NULL) {
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-		if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, b, priv_key, order, ctx)) { /* bx */
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_mod_mul(bxr, bxr, ret->r, order, ctx)) { /* bxr */
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_mod_mul(bm, b, m, order, ctx)) { /* bm */
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_mod_add(s, bm, bxr, order, ctx)) { /* s = bm + bxr */
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) { /* s = b(m + xr)k^-1 */
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, binv, order, ctx)) { /* s = (m + xr)k^-1 */
-			ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-		if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
-			/*
-			 * If kinv and r have been supplied by the caller,
-			 * don't generate new kinv and r values
-			 */
-			if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
-				ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
-				goto err;
-			}
-
-			if (++attempts > ECDSA_MAX_SIGN_ITERATIONS) {
-				ECDSAerror(EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS);
-				goto err;
-			}
-		} else
-			/* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
-			break;
-	} while (1);
-
-	ok = 1;
-
- err:
-	if (ok == 0) {
-		ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
-		ret = NULL;
-	}
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-	BN_free(b);
-	BN_free(binv);
-	BN_free(bm);
-	BN_free(bxr);
-	BN_free(kinv);
-	BN_free(m);
-	BN_free(order);
-	BN_free(range);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-int
-ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-    const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	ECDSA_SIG *s;
-	unsigned char *der = NULL;
-	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
-	int derlen = -1;
-	int ret = -1;
-
-	if ((s = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
-		return (ret);
-	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
-	derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
-	if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
-		goto err;
-	ret = ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
-
- err:
-	freezero(der, derlen);
-	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
-    EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	BN_CTX *ctx;
-	BIGNUM *order, *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
-	EC_POINT *point = NULL;
-	const EC_GROUP *group;
-	const EC_POINT *pub_key;
-	int ret = -1;
-
-	if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
-	    (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-	order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	if (X == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	/* Verify that r and s are in the range [1, order-1]. */
-	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
-	    BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 ||
-	    BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
-	    BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
-		ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-		ret = 0;
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	if (!ecdsa_prepare_digest(dgst, dgst_len, order, m))
-		goto err;
-
-	if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(u2, sig->s, order, ctx) == NULL) { /* w = inv(s) */
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {		/* u1 = mw */
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {		/* u2 = rw */
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	/* Compute the x-coordinate of G * u1 + pub_key * u2. */
-	if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
-		ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	/* If the signature is correct, the x-coordinate is equal to sig->r. */
-	ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
-
- err:
-	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-	EC_POINT_free(point);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, NULL, NULL, eckey);
-}
-
-ECDSA_SIG *
-ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, const BIGNUM *kinv,
-    const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	if (eckey->meth->sign_sig != NULL)
-		return eckey->meth->sign_sig(dgst, dlen, kinv, rp, eckey);
-	ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
-    unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, dgst, dlen, sig, siglen, NULL, NULL, eckey);
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig,
-    unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	if (eckey->meth->sign != NULL)
-		return eckey->meth->sign(type, dgst, dlen, sig, siglen, kinv, r, eckey);
-	ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
-{
-	if (eckey->meth->sign_setup != NULL)
-		return eckey->meth->sign_setup(eckey, ctx_in, kinvp, rp);
-	ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
-    EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	if (eckey->meth->verify_sig != NULL)
-		return eckey->meth->verify_sig(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey);
-	ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-    const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
-	if (eckey->meth->verify != NULL)
-		return eckey->meth->verify(type, dgst, dgst_len,
-		    sigbuf, sig_len, eckey);
-	ECDSAerror(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
-{
-	BIGNUM *order = NULL;
-	const EC_GROUP *group;
-	ECDSA_SIG signature;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	if (r == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL))
-		goto err;
-
-	signature.r = order;
-	signature.s = order;
-
-	if ((ret = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(&signature, NULL)) < 0)
-		ret = 0;
-
- err:
-	BN_free(order);
-
-	return ret;
-}